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1 Introduction
Why do agents trade in nancial markets? In the traditional paradigm, the answer is unequivo-
cal: rational agents trade only insofar as they have private information about the fundamental
value of the asset being traded. Agents who are not informed and only observe market prices
do not trade. The reason, as noted by Easley and OHara (1991), is that in standard rational
expectations models any trading strategy that is contingent on observed prices would be neu-
tralized by any risk-neutral trader who observes the same prices, and thus earn zero or negative
prots.
This standard paradigm has been called into question by the unprecedented recent growth of
trading by large nancial institutions. Many such institutions increasingly develop quantitative
trading strategies and implement them by algorithms (e.g., Osler (2003), Hendershott et al.
(2011)). Quantitative strategies quickly process a large amount of data to map past prices and
other quantiable public information into orders and trades, often without aiming to trade on
superior information about the fundamental value of the assets. The fact that such quantitative
strategies are systematically protable raises the question, are these trades at odds with infor-
mationally e¢ cient markets? A large body of literature suggests that systematic uninformed
trading contingent on past prices represents a departure from the neoclassical model, stemming
instead from behavioral biases, imperfect or bounded rationality, non-standard preferences (e.g.,
for liquidity), or institutional frictions (see Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for
reviews).
We argue that price-contingent trading strategies naturally emerge as optimal and fully
rational behavior in a setting with a single departure from an otherwise standard rational
expectations framework. We relax the assumption that the types of all traders are public infor-
mation, and introduce a large trader that may or may not be informed about the fundamental,
whereby his type is not known to the market. By itself, such uncertainty about a traders
type generates an information advantage for that same trader who knows his own type, which
triggers price-contingent trading. The interpretation of this information advantage is a natural
one: a large trader such as a nancial institution owns a complex portfolio and faces a set of
exposures that the rest of the market does not perfectly observe.
We aim to establish our results on price-contingent trading in a setting with as small a
departure as possible from the standard framework. We do not model all real-world nuances of
quantitative strategies. We examine a stylized trading model in the tradition of Kyle (1985),
with two trading rounds and one risky asset. There is a large risk-neutral trader, type K
(same type of agent as in Kyle (1985)), who is informed about the fundamental value of the
asset, , and noise traders who trade for reasons outside the model and uncorrelated with the
fundamental. Our main innovation is to introduce another large risk-neutral trader, type P
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(for potentially "price-contingent"), who may be informed or not about , and focus on Ps
trading incentives.
Strategic traders K and P submit market orders before knowing the execution price and
taking into account the expected price impact of their order. As standard in this class of models,
we impose that prices are set such that the market is semi-strong e¢ cient, i.e., prices reect
all public information, which includes the total order ow but does not include knowledge of
Ps type. Such market e¢ ciency condition is implemented through a hypothetical agent, the
Market (often referred to as market maker in the literature). At the same time, the market
is not strong-form e¢ cient because traders will prot from private information. Indeed, K
always holds private information about , and P always knows his own type informed (I) or
uninformed (U) while the Market does not know Ps type. This is true even when P does
not directly observe , which is crucial for our results.
In the rst trading round P trades only if he knows . This is because his only other
information is the prior, which is publicly known. Our main result arises in the second period
if P is realized to be uninformed. In such case, P knows he has not traded in the previous
round, so that the order ow, y1, was generated by K and by the noise traders. By contrast,
the Market learns from prices and order ow and updates the probability that P is uninformed,
but in equilibrium still rationally weighs the possibility that the order ow y1 reected an order
by informed P . As a result, prices are set to p1 = E[jy1]. The uncertainty about Ps type leads
di¤erent agents to hold di¤erent expectations about the fundamental value upon observing date
1 order ow, y1. Namely, we show that
E[jy1; U ] 6= E[jy1] = p1;
simply because date 1 order ow is in general not independent of the number of informed
traders. As a result, uninformed P has incentives to trade at date 2. We start by assuming
that noise trading is normally distributed, as it naturally stems from the central limit theorem
when applied to a large number of small exogenous orders. The date 2 trading problem is
non-trivial, as Ps expected payo¤ depends on how much the Market will learn about Ps type
after observing date 2 order ow, which in turn depends on the unobservable noise trading
shock. Still, we prove that there is a unique optimal pure strategy for P . This strategy is
characterized by a non-zero trade contingent on past prices and proportional to the standard
deviation of noise trading.
We then explore under which conditions price-contingent trading is positive-feedback (i.e.,
in the same direction of past price movements), or contrarian. As the distribution of the fun-
damental a¤ects date 1 equilibrium price and expectations, the shape of the distribution turns
out to be crucial in determining the direction of optimal price-contingent trading. Specically,
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we focus on two cases based on common distributional assumptions: the normal distribution,
which is suitable for modelling such continuous variables as a companys future prots or cash
ows, and a two-point distribution, which is more appropriate for discrete events such as the
emergence of a takeover bid, the awarding of a patent, the success of a drug trial or the res-
olution of a legal dispute. We show that these two common assumptions lead to opposite
predictions: with a normal prior, price-contingent trading is always positive-feedback; with a
two-point distribution, it is always contrarian.
What drives these results? Unlike the normal, the two-point distribution is bounded and
has no mass in the center. As a result, the Market will react to the order ow by setting prices
too close to the bounds of the distribution, which implies the optimal strategy is contrarian.
We examine the e¤ects of boundedness and mass in the center in more detail by studying a
symmetric three-point distribution. We nd that with a large order ow the optimal strategy
is still contrarian, as in the two-point case above. This e¤ect is driven by the bounded support,
and is absent in the normal case. On the other hand, if the order ow is small in the three-point
case then price-contingent trading becomes positive-feedback, provided there is enough mass
in the center of the distribution, i.e., enough probability of "no news". The reason is that,
with enough probability mass in the center and a small order ow the Market will tend to
underestimate the possibility that the fundamental value is high or low. Therefore, when P is
uninformed and knows he did not contribute to the order ow, P is better positioned than the
Market to infer that past prices are adjusting in the direction of the fundamental, reecting
only Ks information. As a result, Ps optimal strategy is positive-feedback. In general, the
forces that determine the direction of trading can be understood by noting that the order ow
signal has a higher mean in state U, which pushes towards positive-feedback trading; but the
order ow signal is also more noisy in state U, which pushes towards contrarian trading. Which
force dominates depends on the prior.
In addition to solving explicitly the above mentioned cases, we discuss our results in the
context of other distributions for the prior and noise trading. Price-contingent trading emerges
in general as an equilibrium strategy for uninformed agents, without depending on particular as-
sumptions about the distribution of the fundamental. The shape of this distribution determines
only the direction of trading. While assuming normality of noise trading is intuitive due to the
central limit theorem, we argue that our results extend beyond the normal case, as long as the
noise trading distribution has some desirable and realistic features, most notably, log-concavity.
Log-concavity is shown to be necessary for the Markets learning process to be monotonic in
the order ow (see also Milgrom (1981)). Log-concavity is desirable since it guarantees that
strategic traders K and P face a meaningful trade-o¤ between trading a higher quantity to
benet from their information, as opposed to a lower quantity to prevent their information to
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be reected into prices too quickly. Log-concavity is also realistic, since empirically the market
impact is monotonic in the order ow (e.g., Evans and Lyons (2002)).
One notable feature of our equilibrium is that, while the market is semi-strong e¢ cient by
construction and therefore future returns are unpredictable as in previous literature, the future
order ow is instead predictable from past information. This feature stands in sharp contrast
with traditional models of trading in which also the order ow is unpredictable. The reason
is that in our setting, while the Market cannot be sure whether P is uninformed, still the
Market knows that if P is uninformed he will trade in a predictable, price-contingent direction.
Therefore, one robust implication of our model is that in general the order ow is predictable
even if returns are not, consistent with available empirical evidence (e.g., Biais, Hillion, and
Spatt (1995), Lillo and Farmer (2004)). More generally, our results demonstrate that order ow
predictability is entirely consistent with market e¢ ciency.
Section 2 discusses some of the related literature. Section 3 outlines the setup. Section 4
presents the main results assuming normal noise trading; and a normal, a two-point, and a
three-point prior using technical Theorems and Lemmas provided in Appendix A. Section 5
discusses the generality of our results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
The broad literature on asset pricing and learning in micro-founded nancial markets is surveyed
in Brunnermeier (2001) and Vives (2008), among others. Our work relates to the part of the
literature that studies trading in markets with asymmetric information. Our results on the
protability of rational price-contingent trading require that informed traders be large, i.e.,
that their trades have market impact. We develop our model in a setting that generalizes the
Kyle (1985) framework, but similar implications could be obtained in a Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) framework in which trades arrive probabilistically and market makers observe individual
trades (see also Back and Baruch (2004)).
Our model shows that rational traders with market impact and superior information about
their own type can learn from prices better than average market participants. Another strand
of the literature studies whether past prices contain useful information for a rational trader
(e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Brown and Jennings (1989)). However, in these papers
there are no prots from uninformed trading in excess of the risk premium.
Our paper also relates to the literature on stock price manipulation, that is, the idea that
rational traders may have an incentive to trade against their private information. Provided ma-
nipulation is followed by some (exogenously assumed) price-contingent trading, short run losses
can be more than o¤set by long term gains (see Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) for a review).
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Somewhat closer to our work, Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004a, 2004b) study the incentives of
an informed trader when there is uncertainty about whether such trader is informed, or is a
noise trader instead. If this trader turns out to be informed, he may choose to disregard his
information and trade randomly, in order to build a reputation as a noise trader. In their model,
uninformed traders are never rational. Therefore, Chakraborty and Yilmaz do not analyze the
trading incentives of rational agents when they are uninformed, which is our main focus.
Goldstein and Guembel (2008) show that if stock prices a¤ect real activity then a form
of trade-based manipulation such as short-sales by uninformed speculators can be protable
insofar as it causes rms to cancel positive NPV projects, and justies ex post the "gamble" for
a lower rm value. Such manipulation is possible because there is uncertainty about whether
speculators are informed. In their setting, both uninformed trading and successful stock price
manipulation stem from the feedback e¤ect between stock prices and real activity. By contrast,
in our paper there is price-contingent trading but no manipulation. Therefore, our results
demonstrate that price-contingent trading does not make uninformed investors the inevitable
prey of (potentially informed) speculators.
Finally, our work relates to the literature on rational herding (see Chamley (2004) for a
review). Unlike our setting in which traders never disregard their private information, these
models characterize conditions under which rational traders ignore their noisy private signal and
follow the actions of other traders instead. In particular, in a recent paper Park and Sabourian
(2011) show in a framework with a three-point prior how rational herd and contrarian-like
behavior can emerge in an e¢ cient market, and identify signal structures that give rise to
such behavior. In their setting, all strategic traders observe some relatively imprecise private
signal about the fundamental. By contrast, in our setting strategic traders observe either a
precise private signal or only quantiable public information that they interpret better than
the market. A common theme of our papers is that rather general information structures are
shown to allow for behavior that has traditionally been seen as contradicting trader rationality
and informationally e¢ cient markets.
3 Setup
The model is in the spirit of Kyle (1985) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), where a single
risky asset with fundamental value  is traded at date 1 and 2 and the fundamental is realized
at date 3. We assume common knowledge of the prior distribution of ; and we consider a
variety of distributional assumptions specied in the relevant sections. We maintain that the
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prior probability density (or mass function) is mean zero and symmetric.1
We focus on two trading rounds to capture traders short-run incentives in the simplest
setting. As in the aforementioned papers, there are large strategic risk-neutral traders and
noise traders who submit market orders before knowing the execution price. The equilibrium
prices are set by a hypothetical agent, the Market, who observes the total order ow and
implements the market e¢ ciency condition.2 Namely, he sets period t price,
pt = E

j
Mt

, (1)
where 
Mt is the information set available to the Market in t 2 f1; 2g, which includes all
publicly available information such as the current and past order ows. We formally specify
the information set at the end of this Section.
Our goal is to show how price-contingent trading emerges as optimal in a setting that
deviates as little as possible from the standard model; we assume as in Kyle (1985) that there
is a large risk-neutral trader K, who learns the value of fundamental  before date 1 and trades
only in date 1. Our main innovation is to introduce another large risk-neutral trader, P , whose
type/state, R 2 fI; Ug, is not known with certainty to the Market. We denote
R =
(
I if P is "informed (i.e., knows )"
U if P is "uninformed (i.e., does not know )"
.
The prior probability is Pr (I) = , where 0 <  < 13. When the state is R = I, then P
is identical to K and only trades at date 1. We are particularly interested in Ps trading
incentives when the state is R = U . If he is uninformed, he still observes the past information
such as order ows and prices, and can trade on both dates. Provided that date 1 price is
an invertible function of the order ow, then past order ow and prices have exactly the same
information content - so if he trades at date 2, then he can be viewed as a "price-contingent
trader". We assume that only uninformed P can trade in date 2 for transparency of the e¤ects.
We could interpret that the realization of Ps type may be seen as an outcome of Ps previous
1If the mean is non-zero, then one can always redene a new fundamental value with zero mean by subtracting
the prior mean from the original random variable. We assume symmetry of all the distributions we consider,
to abstract from the additional e¤ects that the skewness of the prior or noise trading distributions can have on
trading incentives.
2In models based on Kyle (1985), this agent is frequently referred to as the "market maker". We prefer to
call him the Market to emphasize that such agent proxies for the information observed by the whole market, as
opposed to any individual broker. The market e¢ ciency condition (1) can also be interpreted as the outcome
of Bertrand competition between market makers or as the equilibrium outcome of a large number of small
risk-neutral agents who take prices as given.
3We assume that  is not arbitrarily close to one, for technical convenience (see Appendix B), and also
because it realistically avoids the case where the Market is too reluctant to update his beliefs about Ps type.
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unobservable decision where he decided whether to invest in acquiring fundamental information
about  or to invest in a "machine" that allows him to trade by implementing mechanical rules.
It is natural to assume that P knows his own type. We also assume that K knows Ps type
with certainty, but this is not crucial for our results.4
Being "large" in this setting means that as in Kyle (1985) strategic traders K and P do not
take the (expected) asset price as given, but know that their market orders have a non-negligible
impact on prices.
Denote the market order by trader J 2 fK;Pg in state R 2 fI; Ug at date t 2 f1; 2g as
hRJt . If both traders are informed, R = I, then trader J solves
max
hIJ1
IJ1 = E

hIJ1 (   p1) j; I

, (2)
where J 2 fK;Pg. If only K is informed about the fundamental, R = U , then K solves
max
hUK1
UK1 = E

hUK1 (   p1) j; U

; (3)
and P solves5
max
hUP1
UP1 = E

hUP1 (   p1) + hUP2 (   p2) jU

(4)
max
hUP2
UP2 = E

hUP2 (   p2) jy1; U

.
The total order ow is
y1 = h
RK
1 + h
RP
1 + s1 for R = fI; Ug (5)
y2 =
(
s2 if R = I
hUP2 + s2 if R = U;
where st is date t 2 f1; 2g demand by noise traders.6
In Section 4, we assume that noise traders demand is drawn from a normal distribution with
4This assumption makes it ex ante harder for P to develop an information advantage as P never has more
information than K. It also allows us to highlight that for price-contingent trading to emerge as optimal, it is
important that typical market participants (the Market) do not know large traders types with certainty, even
if other large traders do.
5We condition Ps expectation on the order ow (instead of the price or both), because date 1 order ow
is always at least as informative as date 1 price. The price is an endogenous function of the order ow to be
determined in equilibrium. If price is monotonic in the order ow, then the two have the same information
content.
6The presence of noise traders is also needed in general for avoiding the Grossman and Stiglitzs (1980)
paradox about the impossibility of a fully revealing price in equilibrium.
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mean zero and variance 2s , serially uncorrelated and independent of fundamental and state.
Therefore, the probability density function of noise traders demand for t 2 f1; 2g is 's (s),
where
's (s)  1p
2s
exp

  s
2
22s

. (6)
While being a standard assumption in this literature, there is also a natural economic argument
for this distribution choice. We can interpret noise trading as the total demand by a large
number of small traders who trade for idiosyncratic reasons unrelated to the fundamental (such
as liquidity shocks, private values etc.). In such case, the normality of the distribution of noise
trading follows directly from the central limit theorem.
Technically, a useful property of the normal distribution is that it is strictly log-concave,
allowing us to use some general properties of log-concave functions.7 Log-concavity of noise
trading also guarantees some desirable properties of the model, and we discuss generality further
in Section 5.8
Finally, we state more formally what is contained in the Markets information set. The
Market knows all distributions, and observes the total order ow yt before setting pt. Crucially,
he does not know the realization of Ps type, i.e., the value of R. We denote the Markets
information set as 
M1 = fy1g and 
M2 = fy1; y2g. It is worth highlighting that in this setting the
order ows provide noisy information about both the fundamental, , and Ps type, R 2 fI; Ug.
This is in contrast to standard settings where all types are known with certainty and the total
order ow only reveals information about the fundamental. Using the law of total expectations,
we can expand the Market e¢ ciency condition (1) as
p1 = E [jy1] = Q1E [jy1; I] + (1 Q1)E [jy1; U ] (7)
p2 = E [jy1; y2] = Q2E [jy1; y2; I] + (1 Q2)E [jy1; y2; U ] ,
where Q1  Pr (Ijy1) and Q2  Pr (Ijy1; y2) are the probabilities of P being informed con-
ditional on the observed total order ows. We also use notation p1 (y1), p2 (y2), Q1 (y1) and
Q2 (y2) to express these prices and probabilities as functions of contemporaneous order ows.
To summarize the setup, the timing of events is as follows:
 date 0 - Nature draws R 2 fI; Ug and . K and P learn R. If R = I, then both K and
P learn . If R = U , only K learns .
7A function f (x) (where x is a n-component vector) is log-concave if ln (f (x)) is concave. In the univariate
and di¤erentiable case, the following are equivalent: 1) @2 ln (f (x)) =@x@x < 0, 2) f 0 (x) =f (x) is decreasing in
x, 3) f 00 (x) f (x)  (f 0 (x))2 < 0.
8Many other well known distributions are log-concave and symmetric. Notable examples include the beta
(with parameters  =  > 1) and truncated normal. (See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for an overview and
further examples of log-concave densities).
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 date 1 - K, P and noise traders submit market orders before knowing the price. The
Market observes total order ow and sets the price p1 based on the market e¢ ciency
condition (1).
 date 2 - Noise traders submit market orders. If R = U , then P also submits a market
order before knowing the price. The Market observes total order ow and sets the price
p2 based on the market e¢ ciency condition (1).
 date 3 - uncertainty resolves and P and K consume prots given the realization of .
As standard in the literature we focus on equilibria in pure strategies by K and P .
4 Results
4.1 Importance of uncertainty about types
We start by highlighting why the uncertainty about Ps type is important. For a benchmark,
let us assume that P is known to be uninformed with certainty, i.e., Pr (I) =  = 0, and
consider any symmetric prior (such that the prior mean exists). As we are only interested
in Ps incentives, assume that informed trader Ks optimal strategy is given by gU () and
it holds that g0U (:) > 0 and gU () =  gU ( ). This is not restrictive and also holds in
all settings we analyze.9 We should note that log-concavity of noise trading guarantees that
E [j~y1; U ]   E [jy1; U ] > 0 for any ~y1 > y1 (See Lemma A.2 in Appendix A) for any prior
distribution. This in turn allows us state the following proposition for any symmetric and
log-concave density of noise trading (i.e., not just for normal density).
Proposition 1 If  = 0: E [jy1; U ] = E [jy1] = p1 = p2; P can never earn positive expected
prots from trading; consequently P does not trade in date 1.
Proof. By a straightforward application of Bayes rule, it holds that  = 0 =) Q1 = 0
and Q2 = 0. Also, notice that in this case date 2 order ow is not informative about the
fundamental, i.e., it must hold that E [jy1; y2; U ] = E [jy1; U ]. From (7), we then nd that
p1 = E [jy1] = E [jy1; U ] = p2. From (4), Ps expected date 2 prots are E

hUP2 (   p2) jy1; U

= hUP2 (E [jy1; U ]  p1) = 0. Therefore, P earns zero prot at date 2 irrespective of the quantity
he trades. For date 1, suppose that the Market sets the price under the belief that P trades
a known quantity h1U at date 1. Given these beliefs, P chooses hUP1 that corresponds to an
9Given the symmetry of all distributions assumed, it is natural to expect symmetric strategies. The fact
that the informed traders strategy is increasing in the fundamental follows from the supermodularity of the
informed traders problem (see the discussion in Section 5).
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order ow (see (5)) y1 = hUP1 + s1 + gU (). The order ow is uncertain at the time of Ps
date 1 trading decision due to the presence of s1 and . Using that Ps prot at date 2 is
always zero and E [jU ] = 0, (4) can be written as UP1 =  hUP1 E [p1jU ], where E [p1jU ] =R R
p1
 
hUP1 + s1 + gU ()

fs (s1) fU () ds1d.10 The rst derivative of prot is @UP1 =@h
UP
1 =
 E [p1jU ]   hUP1
 
@E [p1jU ] =@hUP1

. Because p1 = E [jy1; U ], by Lemma A.2 in Appendix A,
the price is increasing in the order ow, and it holds that  hUP1
 
@E [p1jU ] =@hUP1

< (>) 0 for
any hUP1 > (<) 0. Due to the symmetry of distributions and the fact that prices increase in the
order ow, it also holds that  E [p1jU ] < (>) 0 for any hUP1 > (<) 0.11 Therefore, Ps prot is
maximized at hUP1 = 0. In equilibrium, the beliefs of the Market must be consistent with Ps
optimal strategy, i.e., it holds that hUP1 = h1U = 0. In such a case, also 
UP
1 = 0.
Proposition 1 shows that in the special case in which  = 0, our model supports the Easley
and OHara (1991) argument against the possibility of uninformed traders proting from ratio-
nal price-contingent trading. Indeed, in such a case uninformed P cannot earn positive prots,
because prices already reect all the public information than an uninformed P could have. To
be more specic, at date 1 uninformed Ps best guess of the fundamental is the prior mean
and any non-zero quantity traded would move the prices such that he obtains an expected
loss from trading. Therefore, it is optimal for him not to trade, which yields a zero prot.
At date 2, uninformed P does learn new information from the order ow, but the informa-
tion he obtains is exactly the same as the information that the Market has already obtained,
E [jy1; U ] = E [jy1] = p1. Because prices will not change between date 1 and 2, he cannot earn
positive prots from trading.12
We will demonstrate that in a more general setting where there is uncertainty about Ps
type, then it is typically the case that E [jy1; U ] 6= E [jy1] = p1 (and also Q1; Q2 > 0 and
Q1 6= Q2), which allows price-contingent trading to be protable. Essentially, uninformed P
will have superior information compared to the Market - not because he knows more about the
fundamental directly, but because the order ow reveals di¤erent information depending on how
many strategic traders are informed. Knowing his own type and past trades (or lack thereof)
10A similar argument holds for a discrete distribution of the fundamental and/or of noise trading.
11From Lemma A.2 in Appendix A it also holds that p1
 
y1   h1U

=
 p1
  y1 + h1U. Therefore, E [p1jU ] = R>0 Rs1>0 P1  hUP1 ; s1; ; h1U fs (s1) fU () ds1d, where
P1
 
hUP1 ; s1; ;
h1U
  p1  hUP1 + s1 + gU () + h1U   h1U + p1  hUP1 + s1   gU () + h1U   h1U  
p1
  hUP1 + s1   gU ()  h1U + h1U   p1   hUP1 + s1 + gU ()  h1U + h1U : As prices are increasing in
the order ow, it holds that P1
 
hUP1 ; s1; ;
h1U

is always non-negative and strictly positive for some values of
s1;  > 0 i¤ hUP1 > 0.
12Note that in our setting, the Market knows that date 2 order ow is not informative and thus prices will
not change, p2 = p1. As a result P would earn zero prots from any quantity traded. In this setting hUP2 = 0,
but also any other constant quantity traded by uninformed P at date 2 can be sustained as an equilibrium.
However, the latter only holds because of risk neutrality of P . Clearly, only the equilibrium with hUP2 = 0 could
be sustained with even a very small degree of risk aversion.
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will be enough for P to indirectly retrieve some private information about the fundamental.
4.2 Date 2 problem
Assume  > 0 and take all date 1 quantities, E [jy1; R] ; p1 and Q1 = Pr (Ijy1) as given. Date
2 problem is only interesting if there is a di¤erence between Ps and the Markets expectations
about the fundamental (E [jy1; U ] 6= p1 or equivalently E [jy1; U ] 6= E [jy1; I]) and the Market
has not fully learned Ps type (Q1 > 0). For now, we conjecture that this is the case and verify
it in next sections for di¤erent priors.
As there is no informed trading at date 2, it holds that conditional on a given state R 2
fI; Ug and y1, the date 2 order ow only depends on  through y1, which is already incorporated
in prices and expectations and therefore E [jy1; y2; R] = E [jy1; R]. Using (7) we obtain
p2 = p1 +
(Q1  Q2)
Q1
(E [jy1; U ]  p1) . (8)
Clearly prices change between date 1 and 2 only if Q2 6= Q1, which implies that they only change
if the Market updates his beliefs about Ps type after observing date 2 order ow. Provided
that the true state is R = U , the Market updates in the "correct" direction if Q2 < Q1. In
such case the prices increase (decrease) if E [jy1; U ] > (<) p1. Using (8), we can restate Ps
problem (4) as
max
hUP2
UP2 = h
UP
2 E [Q2jy1; U ]
(E [jy1; U ]  p1)
Q1
= (9)
= hUP2
Z 1
 1
Q2
 
hUP2 + s2

's (s2) s2

(E [jy1; U ]  p1)
Q1
:
We can make some immediate observations. Note that E [jy1; U ], p1 and Q1 only depend on
date 1 order ow and are known to P . Suppose that E [jy1; U ] > p1, i.e., uninformed P expects
the fundamental to be higher than date 1 price. On the one hand, P can prot from trading
any positive quantity. Ignoring the e¤ect of his trade on Q2 (:) would make him to want to buy
an innitely large quantity of the asset at date 2. On the other hand, the term E [Q2jy1; U ]
captures the expected updating of Ps type by the Market. Because Q2 depends on date 2
order ow, P knows that his trade will a¤ect the Marketsbeliefs about his type. Since these
beliefs directly a¤ect p2, one would expect the traditional trade-o¤ between transaction size
and information disclosure to be present, but to establish this we need to investigate further
the properties of Q2.
As we focus on the pure strategies and uninformed Ps trading strategy can only depend on
known variables, it must hold that Ps equilibrium quantity is a constant known to the Market
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at this stage. So let us suppose that such equilibrium exists and uninformed P trades h2 in
equilibrium. Then, from (5) y2 = h2 + s2 if R = U and y2 = s2 if R = I, we can derive Q2 by
using the Bayesrule, as
Q2 =
Q1f (y2jy1; I)
Q1f (y2jy1; I) + (1 Q1) f (y2jy1; U) =
Q1
Q1 + (1 Q1) r (y2) , (10)
where
r (y2) 
's
 
y2   h2

's (y2)
(11)
is the likelihood ratio and we used the fact that conditional on the state R the date 2 order
ow is normal and 's (:) is given by (6).
Lemma 1 The following properties hold for Q2 = Pr (Ijy1; y2)
1. Q2 is decreasing (increasing) in y2 for any h2 > (<) 0.
2. If h2 > 0 then Q2 > (<)Q1 for any y2 < (>)
h2
2
. If h2 < 0 then Q2 > (<)Q1 for any
y2 > (<)
h2
2
.
3. Q2 (0) = Q1 

Q1 + (1 Q1) 's(
h2)
's(0)
 1
= Q1 

Q1 + (1 Q1) exp

 (h2)
2
22s
 1
,
4. If h2 > (<) 0 then lim
y2!1
Q2 (y2) = 0 (= 1) and lim
y2! 1
Q2 (y2) = 1 (= 0).
5. Q2 (y2) is a log-concave function.
Proof. Part 1: Di¤erentiating and simplifying we obtain @Q2=@y2 =  Q22 (1=Q1   1) r0 (y2).
Because Lemma A.1 in Appendix A shows that log-concavity of 's implies the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP), i.e., r0 (y2) > (<) 0 for any h2 > (<) 0. This is because
's
 
~y2   h2

='s (~y2) > (<)'s
 
y2   h2

='s (y2) for any ~y2 > 0 and h2 > (<) 0. Parts 2-4 are
straightforward from (6), (10) and (11). Part 5: Taking logs and di¤erentiating, we obtain that
@2 ln(Q2)
@y2@y2
=   (1 Q1)
2[(1=Q1 1)r00(y2)+r00(y2)r(y2) (r0(y2))2]
(Q1+(1 Q1)r(y2))2 . It is su¢ cient to show that the likelihood
ratio (11) is (at least weakly) log-convex.13 Indeed from (6) and (11) we nd that ln (r (y2)) is
linear in y2 and therefore weakly convex.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 implies that the Market updates his beliefs about Ps type (the state
R) in a "sensible" manner. For example, if the Market believes that trader P in state R = U
trades a nite and positive quantity, then observing a higher order ow always leads the Market
13r (y2) is log-convex if ln (r (y2)) is convex. Equivalently, it must hold that r00 (y2) r (y2)   (r0 (y2))2  0.
This, together with r (y2) > 0 also implies that r00 (y2) > 0.
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to assign a lower probability on him being informed. This also conrms that P indeed faces
a meaningful trade-o¤ - if he trades more aggressively, then he expects the Market to assign a
higher probability on him being uninformed, which reduces his prots.14 It is worth emphasizing
that such realistic property is present only because the likelihood ratio (11) is monotone (for a
similar argument, see also Milgrom (1981)). The monotone likelihood ratio property holds for
the whole family of log-concave distributions, to which the normal belongs (see Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A).
While Bayesian updating itself guarantees that the Market updates his beliefs in the correct
direction on average, we can see from part 2 of Lemma 1 that ex post the Market can update
the probability that P is informed, Q2, in the "correct" or "incorrect" direction. This is because
the total order ow includes a random noise trading component. If the realized order ow is
relatively small (half of the volume that the Market expects uninformed P to trade) or has an
opposite sign to Ps expected trade, then the Market updates in the "correct" direction if the
state is R = I and in the "incorrect" direction if the state is R = U . It is also immediate from
parts 2-4 of Lemma 1 that the Market never learns Ps type perfectly for nite order ows.
Therefore, despite of some learning about Ps type, it is clear from (9) that P would always
earn positive prots from trading any nite quantity in the correct direction.
Part 4 of Lemma 1 conrms that the Markets learning about Ps type is unbounded. This
is necessary to guarantee that P has an incentive to trade a nite amount.15
While the previous analysis gives some condence that it may be optimal for uninformed P
to trade a nite quantity in equilibrium, it is not yet clear whether Ps problem has a unique
(interior) solution. Namely, from (9) Ps expected prot involves an integral over a non-trivial
function Q2 (:) that depends on uninformed Ps demand and is always positive for hUP2 > (<) 0
provided that (E [jy1; U ]  p1) > (<) 0.
Lemma 2 If (E [jy1; U ]  p1) > (<) 0 then uninformed Ps expected prot (9) is strictly
log-concave in hUP2 > (<) 0.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that (E [jy1; U ]  p1) > 0 and hUP2 > 0. Taking
logs of (9), we obtain ln
 
UP2

= ln
 
hUP2

+ ln (E [Q2jy1; U ]) + ln (E [jy1; U ]  p1)   ln (Q1)
and @2 ln
 
UP2

=@hUP2 @h
UP
2 =  
 
hUP2
 2
+@2 ln (E [Q2jy1; U ]) =@hUP2 @hUP2 , which is negative if
14If P trades hUP2 , then the order ow is y2 = h
UP
2 + s2 and E [Q2jy1; U ] =
R1
 1Q2
 
hUP2 + s2

's (s) ds. It
is clear that @E [Q2jy1; U ] =@hUP2 =
R1
 1Q
0
2
 
hUP2 + s2

's (s) ds > 0
15Suppose instead that learning was bounded (i.e., Q2 was always larger than some constant Q2 > 0) and
consider a candidate equilibrium where P trades a nite amount. It is easy to prove that this cannot be an
equilibrium as P would earn innite prots by deviating to trade an innite quantity. See also Section 5.
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E [Q2jy1; U ] is log-concave. By change of variables y2 = hUP2 + s2, we can express
E [Q2jy1; U ] =
Z 1
 1
Q2 (y2)'s
 
y2   hUP2

dy2. (12)
Using Theorem 6 of Prékopa (1973), restated as Theorem A.3 on Appendix A, a su¢ cient con-
dition for (12) to be log-concave is that the function Q2 (y2)'s
 
y2   hUP2

is log-concave in hUP2
and y2. Using (6), @2 ln's
 
y2   hUP2

=@hUP2 @h
UP
2 =   2s and @2 ln's
 
y2   hUP2

=@hUP2 @y2 =
@2 ln's
 
y2   hUP2

=@y2@h
UP
2 = 
 2
s . As by part 5 of Lemma 1 @
2 ln (Q2 (y2)) =@y2@y2 < 0, it
is immediate that the Hessian16 is negative denite, and therefore E [Q2jy1; U ] and UP2 are
log-concave. The proof for the case (E [jy1; U ]  p1) < 0 and hUP2 < 0 is similar.
Since any univariate log-concave function is also quasi-concave with a unique maximum, we
can now state our main result:
Theorem 1 Uninformed Ps unique equilibrium strategy is to demand a nite amount
hUP2 =
h2 =
(
s if E [jy1; U ]  p1 > 0
 s if E [jy1; U ]  p1 < 0
, (13)
where  > 1 for any Q1 2 (0; 1) and  depends on Q1 only.
Proof. It is immediate from (9) that hUP2 < (>) 0 when E [jy1; U ]   p1 > (<) 0 cannot be
optimal as it leads to strictly negative prots. By Lemma 2, the uninformed Ps problem then
has a unique maximum at a non-negative hUP2 . Therefore it is su¢ cient to look at the rst
order condition only and then impose that in equilibrium beliefs must be consistent with the
optimal strategy hUP2 = h2. The rst order condition, the expression for  and the proofs of
the statements that  > 0 and only depends on Q1 are stated in Appendix B.
Because  only depends on Q1, it is most illustrative to present the solution17 on a graph
(see Figure 1). We nd that whenever E [jy1; U ] 6= p1 = E [jy1], it is generally optimal for
uninformed P to trade at date 2. The volume traded by him is proportional to the standard
deviation of noise trading and is increasing in Q1. Both e¤ects are intuitive. When the order
ow is more noisy (high s), it is harder for the Market to update his beliefs about the state and
it is less costly for uninformed P to trade more aggressively. Because the Markets posterior
belief that the state is R = I, Q2 = Pr (Ijy1; y2), is increasing in his belief prior to date two,
16The Hessian is
  2s  2s 2s @2 ln (Q2 (y2)) =@y2@y2    2s

17It is relatively easy to prove analytically that if Q1 = 0:5; then  =
p
2. The other values are derived using
numerical integration.
15
Figure 1: Uninformed Ps trading volume at date 2.
Q1, for any order ow, then a higher Q1 again makes it less costly for an uninformed P to trade
more aggressively. Overall P trades a nite quantity as he faces a trade-o¤ between proting
from his superior information and revealing his type too much. This trade-o¤ is fundamentally
similar to the one in Kyle (1985), however di¤erently from that setting Ps private information
is not about the fundamental directly, but about his impact or lack of impact on date 1 price.
Theorem 1 is in stark contrast to Proposition 1, because price-contingent trading is protable.
Before analyzing the date 1 problem, we can now formally dene the two traditional types
of price-contingent strategies within the context of our model.
Denition Ps date 2 strategy is called18
- positive-feedback (momentum) for some y1 if y1 > 0 and hUP2 > 0, or y1 < 0 and h
UP
2 < 0
- negative-feedback (contrarian) for some y1 if y1 > 0 and hUP2 < 0, or y1 < 0 and h
UP
2 > 0.
Provided the price is monotonic in the order ow (as in all our examples below), it would
be equivalent to dene Ps strategy through date 1 price.
4.3 Date 1 problem with a normal prior
We did not yet need to specify the joint distribution of fundamental, , and the state, R.
Here we consider two possibilities. First, we consider a particular dependence structure that
preserves linearity of the date 1 equilibrium, which we present in the main text. The advantage
18The words "momentum" and "contrarian" only refer to Ps strategy. They should not be confused with
positive and negative autocorrelation in returns. By the assumption of e¢ cient market (1), there is zero
autocorrelation by construction. See also Section 4.5.
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of this setting is that it allows us to show how Ps information advantage emerges in a very
familiar setting that is directly comparable to previous models such as Kyle (1985). Second,
we consider the case in which  and R are independent. As the results are almost identical to
the rst case, we relegate this second case to Appendix C.
Assume that
fR () = Pr (Rj) f () = Pr (R) f (jR) = (14)
=
1p
2


I
exp

  
2
22I
~1 1  
U
exp

  
2
22U
1 ~1
,
where ~1 is an indicator function that takes values ~1 = 1 if R = I and ~1 = 0 if R = U
and where I and U are the standard deviations of the prior distribution in state R = I and
R = U respectively. Clearly in (14), the distribution of the fundamental conditional on a state
is normal, while unconditionally the density is still symmetric around zero. To preserve linearity
of the equilibrium, we rst assume that19
I =
3
4
U (15)
as under this assumption, we will shortly prove that the Market cannot update his beliefs about
the state R at date 1.
We solve this problem using the standard technique. We conjecture and later verify that
there is a rational expectations equilibrium where P does not trade in date 1 and date 1 price
is linear in the order ow, i.e.,
p1 = 1y1; (16)
where 1 is a constant to be solved for in the equilibrium. 20
Proposition 2 When the prior is given by (14) and (15), then there exists a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium where the following holds.
1. Informed tradersoptimal demand in date 1 is
hUK1 =

21
; hIK1 = h
IP
1 =

31
gU ()  hUK1 =

21
and gI ()  hIK1 + hIP1 =
2
31
19One could argue that the condition (15) captures the possibility that it may be easier/cheaper for P to
become informed, if there is less uncertainty about the fundamental.
20The problem can also be solved without immediately imposing this conjecture (see, e.g., Cho and El Karoui,
(2000)).
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2. There is no updating about Ps type in the rst trading round, i.e.,
Q1 = Pr (Ijy1) = .
3. Equilibrium price is given by
p1 = 1y1;
where 1 = U2s
q
(2 )
2
and it holds that
E [jy1; I] = 3
4  1y < p1 <
4
4  1y1 = E [jy1; U ]
4. Uninformed P does not trade at date 1, hUP1 = 0.
Proof. Part 1: Given the conjectured price (16) and the total order ow (5), we nd that
in state R = U , the informed traders expected prot (3) is given by E

hUK2 (   p1)

=
hUK2
 
   1hUK2

and Ks optimal demand is hUK1 =

21
. From (16) and (5), trader Js
expected prot is E

hIJ2 (   p1)

= hIJ2
 
   1hIJ2   1hI J2

, where J; J 2 fK;Pg and J 6= J
and we nd that the optimal demand is the same for K and P , and hIK1 = h
IP
1 = =31. Part
2: The total order ow at date 1 in state R = U is y2 = =21 +s1. As jU  N (0; 2U) it holds
that y2jU  N (0; 2U=421 + 2s). The total order ow in state R = I is y2 = 231 + s1. Using
(15), jI  N (0; 2I )  N (0; 92U=16) and y2jI  N (0; 42I=921 + 2s)  N (0; 2U=421 + 2s).
Clearly f (y1jU) = f (y1jI), so by Bayesrule Q1 = Pr (Ijy1) = f(yjI)f(yjI)+(1 )f(yjU) = . Part 3: If
R = U , then the signal that the Market obtains from the order ow is 21y2 = +21s1, where
21y2j  N (; 4212s). As well known in the case of normally distributed prior and signals,
the posterior is a precision-weighted average of the signals, hence we can simplify E [jy1; U ]
=
2U
421
2
s+
2
U
21y2. If R = I then the signal that the Market obtains from the order ow is
3
2
1y2 = +
3
2
1s1, where 321y2j  N
 
; 9
4
21
2
s

. Using (15) and simplifying, we nd E [jy1; I]
=
2U
421
2
s+
2
U
3
2
1y. Given this and Q1 = , (7), we obtain that p1 =
2U [(3=2)+2(1 )]
421
2
s+
2
U
1y2. Equating
coe¢ cients with those in the conjectured prices (16), we nd that 21 = 
2
U (2  ) =82s and the
positive solution of this proves the rst part of the proposition. We then use the equilibrium
value of 1 in the expressions of E [jy1; U ] and E [jy1; I]. Part 4: See Appendix B.
We nd from Proposition 2 that while uninformed P optimally does not trade at date 1,
the rst trading round generates his information advantage for date 2 trading. We can see that
for any non-zero order ow, there will be a di¤erence between the expected value conditional
on knowing the state, E [jy1; R], and date 1 equilibrium price. Furthermore, by the denition
of Ps strategy in Section 4.2 and Theorem 1, we nd that in this setting P always pursues
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a positive feedback trading strategy in date 2, i.e., he buys at date 2 if date 1 order ow is
positive (or equivalently, if the price has increased at date 1) and sells when date 1 order ow
is negative (or equivalently, if the price has decreased).21
Intuitively, P obtains superior information in state R = U because he knows he did not
contribute to the date 1 order ow, while the Market sets the price weighting the possibilities
that the order ow reects information of one or two informed traders. For any realization of
the fundamental  6= 0, the total volume by informed traders is di¤erent (i.e., gU () = 21
versus gI () = 231 ), and therefore the total order ow reveals di¤erent information in di¤erent
states.
Under this prior, uninformed P always perceives the price at date 2 to be too close to
the prior mean and therefore pursues a positive-feedback strategy. Indeed, the sensitivity of
prices to order ow, 1, in Theorem 1 is too low given that the true state is R = U . (If
the Market knew the state, he would set 1 = U2s as in Kyle (1985)). This is the outcome
of two competing e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is related to the value of the fundamental revealed
by the order ow alone. The fundamental is the inverse of total informed traders demand
at y1   s1  = g 1U (y1   s1) = 21 (y1   s1) and  = g 1I (y1   s1) = 321 (y1   s1). It is clear
that, conditional on the order ow alone, the expected value of the fundamental is higher in
state R = U . This is true because the expected value 21 > 321. This e¤ect tends to make
the Market set the price too low at date 1. The second e¤ect relates to the dispersion of the
fundamental conditional on the order ow alone, which is higher in R = U (because the variance
421
2
s >
9
4
21
2
s). Because the Market uses Bayesrule to set the price and puts higher weight
on signals that are less noisy, this e¤ect tends to make the Market set the price too high at
date 1. With normal prior given by (14) and (15), the rst e¤ect always dominates.
In Appendix C we characterize the equilibrium and present the numerical solution of the
case of normal prior that is independent of the state R, i.e., I = U = p in (14), assuming
that  = 0:5. In such case the equilibrium price and strategies are non-linear and there is
some learning about the state at date 1. However, it turns out that all the results are very
similar. In fact, the optimal strategies of informed traders remain very close to linear, there is
imperfect learning about the state in general, and very little updating about the state in the
case of typical order ows. These ndings indicate that our main results for a normal prior in
this Section are not driven by the particular dependence structure between  and R: there is
a di¤erence between E [jy1; U ] and p1 and the optimal strategy of uninformed P at date 2 is
positive-feedback.
21When we refer to price changes at date 1, we adopt the convention that date 0 price equals the prior
p0 = E [] = 0, which is consistent with our assumption of market e¢ ciency.
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4.4 Date 1 problem with a two- and three-point prior distribution.
In this Section we consider a symmetric three-point prior and assume that the fundamental is
independent of the state R.22 Assume
 =
8><>:
  wpr. 1 
2
0 wpr. 
 wpr. 1 
2
; (17)
where 0   < 1 and  > 0. Clearly, the case with  = 0 corresponds to a two-point distribution
and is of special interest, as it is a common assumption in the literature. We rst characterize
the solution of the date 1 problem and then discuss the direction of uninformed Ps trading at
date 2 for di¤erent values of .
4.4.1 The solution
We rst derive the equilibrium price and expectations for di¤erent strategies of traders K and
P and then derive the optimal equilibrium strategies. As we focus on pure strategies, the
demand of K and P must be known to the Market for given realizations of the fundamental
 =
 ; 0; 	. To shorten the argument, we limit our attention to equilibrium strategies that
have some natural properties given the symmetry of the distributions and the fact that P has
no superior information at date 1. Namely, we conjecture that in state R = U , the informed
trader Ks optimal demand is gU if  = , zero if  = 0 and hUK1 =  gU if  =  ; and
uninformed trader P does not trade. In state R = U , the total demand by informed traders
K and P is gI
2
if  = , zero if  = 0 and   gI
2
< 0 if  =  . This allows to derive the main
properties of the equilibrium price and expectations as described by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For the equilibrium price and conditional expectations of the fundamental, it holds
that
1. The price is given by
p1 (y1) = 
Mn (y1) Mp (y1)
Mn (y1) +Mp (y1)
(18)
where Mn (y1)  1 2

's (y1   gI) + (1  )'s (y1   gU) + 1 's (y1)

and Mp (y1)  1 2

's (y1 + gI) + (1  )'s (y1 + gU) + 1 's (y1)

;
22It would be easy to consider, similarly to Section 4.3, a case where there is some dependence of R and .
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2. The conditional expectation of the fundamental is
E [jy1; R] =  's (y1   gR)  's (y1 + gR)
's (y1   gR) + 's (y1 + gR) + 21 's (y1)
; (19)
3. The updated probability of state R = I is
Q1 (y1) = Pr (Ijy1) =

 
's (y1   gI) 1 2 + 's (y1)  + 's (y1 + gI) 1 2

Mn (y1) +Mp (y1)
; (20)
4. The price is increasing in the order ow, i.e., p01 (y1) > 0;
5. The price is symmetric around zero, i.e., p1 (y1) =  p1 ( y1) ;
6. It holds that lim
y1!1
p1 (y1) =  and lim
y1! 1
p1 (y1) =  ;
7.    p1 (y1) > 0 for all (nite) y1;
Proof. For parts 1-3 note that (7) implies that, p1 (y1) = Q1E [jy1; I] + (1 Q1)E [jy1; U ].
By the law of total expectations E [jy1; R] = Pr
 
 = jy1; R
   Pr   =  jy1; R and
by Bayes rule Pr (jy1; R) = 1 2 f (y1j; R) =f (y1jR), where f
 
y1j = ; R

= 's (y1   gR);
f (y1j = 0; R) = 's (y1); f
 
y1j =  ; R

= 's (y1 + gR) and f (y1jR) = f
 
y1j = ; R

1 
2
+
f
 
y1j =  ; R

1 
2
+ f (y1j = 0; R). By Bayesrule Q1 (y1) = f(y1jI)f(y1jI)+(1 )f(y1jU) . Combin-
ing all this proves parts 1-3. For part 4, note that from (6) @'s (y1   c) =@y1 =  's (y1   c) y1 c2s
for any constant c, and it holds that M 0n (y1) =   y12sMn (y1) +
1
2s
Mng (y1) and M 0p (y1) =
  y1
2s
Mp (y1)   12sMpg (y1), where Mng (y1) 
1 
2
(gI's (y1   gI) + (1  ) gU's (y1   gU)) > 0
and Mpg (y1) 
1 
2
(gI's (y1 + gI) + (1  ) gU's (y1 + gU)) > 0. Using the above and di¤erentiating, p01 (y1) =
2
2s
Mng(y1)Mp(y1)+Mpg(y1)Mn(y1)
(Mn(y1)+Mp(y1))
2 > 0. Parts 5-7 are straightforward when using the fact that
's (:) > 0 is an even function, (6) and (18).
Lemma 3 conrms some reasonable and desirable properties of date 1 price, e.g., the price
is increasing in the order ow, symmetric around zero and always between   and . These
properties will be most useful for exploring the informed tradersstrategies and eventually the
direction of price-contingent strategies. If the state is R = U; then the expected prot (3) of K
can be written as
UK2 = h
UK
1
Z 1
 1
(   p (y1))'s
 
y1   hUK1

dy1. (21)
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If the state is R = I then the expected prot (2) of trader J 2 fK;Pg can be written as
IJ2 = h
IJ
1
Z 1
 1
(   p (y1))'s
 
y1   hIK1   hIP1

dy1. (22)
As in Section 4.2, we cannot be immediately sure if the informed traders prots are quasi-
concave in own demand and whether there is a unique maximum. It is clear from (21) and (22)
and part 7 in Lemma 3 that whenever  6= 0, the informed traderss payo¤ involves a non-trivial
integral and is always positive for orders with the same sign as the fundamental.23 Furthermore,
 p1 (y1) cannot be proved to be log-concave for intermediate values of . While log-concavity
is only a su¢ cient but not necessary condition to guarantee uniqueness of the solution of the
traders problem and existence of the pure strategy equilibrium, it is usually di¢ cult to establish
quasi-concavity of integrals under more general conditions.24 In this setting, however, it turns
out that we can still prove quasi-concavity by an alternative approach.
Lemma 4 The expected prot of an informed trader J 2 fI; Ug, in state R 2 fU; Ig is strictly
quasi-concave in hRJ1 and there is an interior maximum.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As we know that informed traders problem has a unique solution, we can now state
Proposition 3 There is a pure strategy equilibrium at date 1, where the following holds:
1. Informed tradersdemand is given by
hUK1 =
8><>:
gU = sU if  = 
0 if 0
 gU =  sU if  =  
and hIK1 = h
IP
1 =
8><>:
gI
2
= s
I
2
if  = 
0 if 0
  gI
2
=  s I2 if  =  
,
where U and I only depend on  and .
2. Total demand by informed traders in the event of news (  =  or  =  ) is always higher
in absolute value in state R = I compared to state R = U , i.e., gI > gU (equivalently
I > U).
3. In state R = U , the uninformed trader P does not trade at date 1, i.e., hUP1 = 0.
23This can be veried using symmetry and Lemma A.1, in Appendix A,
24See for example Prékopa (1980) for a discussion. Also, note for the objective function to always have a unique
maximum, what we need is that the (negative of) rst derivative is a single crossing function. Regarding this,
Quah and Strulovici (2012) discuss the related complications and propose a more relaxed su¢ cient conditions
for aggregation of single crossing property. However, in our setting, that condition would ultimately require
log-concavity of    p1 (y1).
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Figure 2: Informed trading volume for di¤erent values of  and :
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 conrms that the date 1 equilibrium exists and has some intuitive properties.
First, informed traders face the standard trade-o¤ as in Kyle (1985) and Holden and Subrah-
manyam (1992). On the one hand, whenever they have private information that indicates  6= 0
they earn positive expected prots from trading. On the other hand, they know that due to
market impact, trading a higher volume reveals information about the fundamental (and also
less importantly for these traders about the state R) to the Market. Therefore, they trade a
nite amount and the price will not adjust immediately to equal the fundamental value.
As in the previous cases, the trading volume is always proportional to the standard deviation
of noise trading. This is because informed traders benet on average at the expense of noise
traders and more noise allows them to hide private information more easily. Because the equi-
librium price is proportional to the fundamental (see (18)), the magnitude of the fundamental
value does not a¤ect the informed traders optimal strategy, but clearly prots are higher if 
is higher. While for most values of  and  we do not have a nice analytical expression for
the equilibrium strategies,25 by Lemma 4 we know that the solution is unique and by part 1
of Proposition 3 we know that it depends on only two parameters that are between 0 and 1.
Figure 2 illustrates these dependences by plotting on the vertical axis U and I against  (on
the left panel, assuming  = 0) and against  (on the right panel, assuming  = 0:5). These
plots are qualitatively similar for di¤erent values of  and : The e¤ects reported in the gure
are intuitive. First, if the prior probability of the state with two informed traders R = I (i.e.,
Pr (I) = ) is higher, then the informed traders are trading less aggressively. This is because
25We can nd the analytical solution corresponding to Kyle (1985) and to the two-traders version of Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) by extending these to a di¤erent prior distribution. Namely if  = 0 and  = 0, it
holds that U = 1; if  = 0 and  = 1, it holds that
I
2 =
p
2
2 .
23
gI > gU and the Market expects more informed trading and is updating his beliefs faster. This
in turn increases the informed tradersmarket impact and reduces their willingness to trade
aggressively. Second, if the prior probability of "no news" () is higher, the informed traders
trade more aggressively whenever they observe  6= 0. This is because by Bayesrule the Market
is more reluctant to update his beliefs toward the more extreme realizations of the fundamental.
This reluctance reduces the market impact of the informed traders and gives them incentives
to trade more.
The most important part of Proposition 3 is the part 3 which states that the total order
ow by informed traders is di¤erent in the two states. Looking then at the expressions for p1,
E [jy1; I] and E [jy1; U ] suggest that these are all di¤erent. If the state is R = U , then P again
obtains superior information exactly because he knows that he did not trade and thus we can
explore the direction of his trade at date 2.
4.4.2 Direction of price contingent trading
We start by examining the two-point prior, i.e., for now we set  = 0.
Proposition 4 When the prior distribution of the fundamental is a symmetric two-point dis-
tribution, it holds that
E [jy1; U ] < (>)E [jy1; I] , for any y1 > (<) 0.
Whenever 0 <  < 1, the optimal strategy of P in state R = U at date 2 is negative-feedback.
Proof. Assuming  = 0, we obtain from (19) that sgn (E [jy1; U ]  E [jy1; I]) =
sgn

's(y1 gU )
's(y1+gU )
  's(y1 gI)
's(y1+gI)

= sgn

's(y1 gU )
's( y1 gU )  
's(y1 gI)
's( y1 gI)

. Because 's (:) is log-concave and
gI > gU by part 2 in Proposition 3, it holds by the property of log-concave distributions in
Lemma A.1 in Appendix A that sgn

's(y1 gU )
's( y1 gU )  
's(y1 gI)
's( y1 gI)

=  1 if y1 >  y1 , y1 > 0 and
sgn

's(y1 gU )
's( y1 gU )  
's(y1 gI)
's( y1 gI)

= 1 if y1 <  y1 , y1 < 0. By (7) sgn (E [jy1; U ]  E [jy1; I]) =
sgn (E [jy1; U ]  p1) for any 0 < Q1 < 1, which is true for any 0 <  < 1. Uninformed Ps
optimal strategy at date 2, equation (13) in Theorem 1, and the denition of negative-feedback
strategy in Section 4.2 complete the proof.
With a discrete two-point distribution we nd that if the true state is R = U; i.e., P
is uninformed, then Ps optimal strategy at date 2 is always negative-feedback (contrarian).
While there is still optimal price-contingent trading, the direction is exactly the opposite to
what we found in Section 4.3 with a normal prior. Recall that in the case of a normal prior,
the reason why there was positive-feedback trading was that the higher positive order ow
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signalled a higher fundamental in state R = U than in state R = I, and this higher signal e¤ect
dominated the higher uncertainty of the order ow signal. Clearly with a two-point distribution
the higher signal e¤ect is absent, because "news" can either be good or bad, and there is no
sense in which they can be verygood or moderatelygood (re. bad).
We can also observe that a two-point prior is bounded and has no mass in the center, while
a normal is unbounded and has thin tails and substantial probability mass in the center. To
understand the main drivers of the direction of price-contingent trading, it seems then most
transparent, while at the same time still tractable, to consider the case of a three-point prior
distribution whereby the distribution is still bounded, but we can control the mass in the center
by choosing di¤erent values of  (see (17)). It can also be seen as a crude approximation of any
continuous prior distribution that is either bimodal at the extremes, uniform or hump-shaped.
With a three-point distribution we can establish some general properties about the direction of
price-contingent trading.
Proposition 5When the prior distribution of the fundamental is a symmetric three-point prior
distribution and R = U , then for any 0 <  < 1 the following conditions hold for large and
very small order ows
1. at least for order ows y1  gI+gU2 and y1    gI+gU2 , P pursues a negative-feedback
strategy at date 2.
2. for order ows y1 in the neighborhood of zero (i.e., for y1 ! 0), P pursues a positive-
feedback strategy at date 2 i¤ the following condition holds.
1 + exp (2I)

1 
1 + exp (2U)

1 
>
I
U
(23)
Proof. To prove part 1 we use (19) to nd that sgn (E [jy1; U ]  E [jy1; I]) =
sgn

's(y1 gU )
's(y1+gU )
  's(y1 gI)
's(y1+gI)
+ f(y1)
(1 )'s(y1+gU )'s(y1+gI)B (y1)

, where
B (y1)  's (y1   gU)   's (y1 + gU)   's (y1   gI) + 's (y1 + gI). Consider y1 > 0 and let us
focus on the sign of B (y1). Because 's (:) has a maximum at zero and is decreasing for any
positive values, it also holds for any y1 > 0 and gI > gU , that  's (y1 + gU) +'s (y1 + gI) < 0.
We can then nd a su¢ cient condition for also 's (y1   gU)  's (y1   gI)  0 to holds. Dene
b  y1   gI+gU2 and b  0() y1  gI+gU2 . By Corollary A.1.1 in Appendix A and by gI > gU ,
it holds for any b  0 that 's
 
gI gU
2
+ b
  's   gI gU2   b () 's (y1   gU)  's (y1   gI).
Therefore, for any y1  gI+gU2 it holds that B (y1) < 0. From the proof of Proposition 4
(and Lemma A.1 in Appendix A), we already know that 's(y1 gU )
's(y1+gU )
> 's(y1 gI)
's(y1+gI)
for any y1 > 0.
Therefore, sgn (E [jy1; U ]  E [jy1; I]) = sgn (E [jy1; U ]  p1) =  1 for any y1  gI+gU2 and
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0 <  < 1. The denition of negative-feedback strategy in Section 4.2 completes this part of
the proof. The proof for y1    gI+gU2 is similar.
To prove part 2, notice from (19), that at y1 = 0, E [jy1; R] = 0 for R = fI; Ug. For a
positive-feedback strategy to be optimal around zero, it is enough to show that the expected
value, E [jy1; R], is more sensitive to the order ow in state R = U compared to state R = I.
From (19) and (6) and gR = Rs, @E [jy1; R] =@y1jy1=0 =  '0s (gR)

's (gR) +

1 's (0)
 1
= R
s
exp ( 2R)

exp ( 2R) + 1 
 1
. Using the denition of positive-feedback trading from
Section 4.2, (23) then follows from @E [jy1; U ] =@y1jy1=0 > @E [jy1; I] =@y1jy1=0:
Proposition 5 shows that with a three-point prior both positive-feedback and contrarian
strategies are possible at date 2. We also gain insights on which features of the prior distribution
drive the direction of price-contingent trading.
Part 1 of Proposition 5 shows that, when the date 1 order ow is large in absolute value,
then at date 2 uninformed P always pursues a negative-feedback strategy. This is driven by the
bounded support of the prior, and this is why this e¤ect was missing in the case of a normal
prior. Intuitively, high order ows are more likely to be driven by high noise trading shocks
than by a large draw of the fundamental. For example, if the true state is R = U , then any
order ow that exceeds gU must mean that there was a positive noise trading shock, while
the Market will still consider order ows between gU and gI to be potentially reecting small
or even negative noise trading shocks. This reects the previously discussed tendency of the
Market to underestimate the impact of noise trading in driving the date 1 order ow and the
price too high (if the true state is R = U).
Part 2 of Proposition 5 shows that if the probability of no-news is large enough, then at least
for small order ows uninformed Ps optimal strategy at date 2 is positive-feedback. Namely,
there is a threshold level for , above which this inequality holds26 and back-of-the-envelope
calculations indicate that this threshold is quite low.27 This observation highlights the fact that
for positive-feedback trading there should be at least some mass in the center of the distribution.
The intuition for small order ows relates to our earlier discussion about the Market tending
to underestimate the fundamental conditional on the order ow only. Consider a small positive
order ow in this example. If the true state is R = U , then the Market is reluctant to believe
that it is driven by informed traders who observed  (as he considers the possibility that 2
informed traders who would trade gI in total, while the actual informed trading could have
26Note that the right hand side of (23) is always bigger than 1 as I > U by point 2 in Proposition 3. The
right hand side is 1 if  = 0, strictly increasing in  and converges to exp
 
2I

= exp
 
2U

when  ! 1. We can
also verify that exp
 
2I

= exp
 
2U

> I=U at the limit. This is because exp
 
2R

=R is strictly increasing in
R for any R > 0:5. Hence (23) will hold at  ! 1 if I > U > 0:5: It can also be shown that U is at its
lowest when  = 1 and  = 0, and from Figure (2) that in such case U is noticeably higher than 0.5.
27For example, if  = 0:5 then the threshold is around   0:08.
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Figure 3: The di¤erence E [jy1; U ]  p1 for di¤erent values of .
been at most gU) and sets the price relatively close to zero. Because uninformed P knows
at date 2 that his trading did not contribute to date 1 order ow, he benets from positive-
feedback trading on average. Figure (3) illustrates the equilibrium di¤erence, E [jy1; U ]   p1,
(vertical axis) for di¤erent values of , assuming that  = 0:5. On the horizontal axis, there is
always the date 1 order ow, y1. We can see that when  is high enough, then there is a large
set of order ows around zero where jE [jy1; U ]j > jp1j and uninformed Ps optimal strategy
at date 2 is positive-feedback, while at high order ows in absolute value, it always holds that
jE [jy1; U ]j < jp1j and uninformed Ps optimal strategy at date 2 is negative-feedback.
The three-point distribution also allows to derive richer empirical implications. We nd that
price-contingent traders are more likely to act contrarian against large order ows, as these are
more likely to be driven by noise trading shocks. In the case of small order ows, they may
benet from momentum strategies, as these are more likely to reect fundamental information
that is not yet incorporated in prices.
4.5 Predictability of order ow and the e¤ect of price-contingent
trading on market e¢ ciency.
Here we point out some natural consequences of equilibrium price-contingent trading under
either the semi-strong or weak form of market e¢ ciency.
Proposition 6 While there is no predictability in returns, the order ow is predictable.
Proof. The lack of predictability in returns is immediate and is due to imposing the e¢ cient
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market condition (1). By construction p2 = E [jy1; y2] and p1 = E [jy1], and by application of
the law of iterated expectations, it is clear that E [p2   p1jy1] = E [E [jy1; y2] jy1] p1 = E [jy1] 
p1 = 0. At the same time by Theorem 1 we know that if the state is R = U then P trades at
date 2 a known amount h2: Therefore, E [y2jy1] = Pr (Ijy1)E [y2jy1; I] + Pr (U jy1)E [y2jy1; U ] =
Q1E [s2jy1; I] + (1 Q1)E

h2 + s2jy1; U

= (1 Q1)E

h2jy1; U
 6= 0.
In Kyle (1985) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and subsequent models that build on
their framework, imposing the market e¢ ciency condition implies both the lack of predictability
of returns and the lack of predictability of the order ow. As discussed in Section 4.1, there
is no protable and predictable price-contingent trading and future order ow can only reect
unpredictable noise trading and informed trading. Matters di¤er considerably in our more gen-
eral setting, because the Market cannot be perfectly sure of whether there is a price-contingent
trader P or not, but he still knows that if there is one, he will trade in a predictable direction,
described in Propositions 3, 5, and 6. For example, if the optimal strategy is positive-feedback
(e.g., with a normal prior or with a small order ow in the case of a three-point distribution),
the Market expects a positive order ow with some probability; if the actual order ow is zero,
the prices fall. While there can be other reasons for predictability of the order ow, our model
demonstrates that predictability of the order ow by itself does not imply a failure of market
e¢ ciency; and more generally suggests that the order ow can be more predictable than prices,
consistent with available empirical evidence (see, e.g., Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), Ellul,
Holden, Jain, and Jennings (2007), Lillo and Farmer (2004)).
It should also be noted that the type of price-contingent trading we analyze as emerging in
a rational setting without other frictions, on average facilitates price discovery by moving prices
closer to the fundamental. In state R = U , the best estimate of the fundamental conditional
on all the information apart from the fundamental itself is E [jy1; U ], and not E [jy1], so that
uninformed Ps price-contingent trading on average pushes date 2 price p2 closer to E [jy1; U ].
There is also no sense in which contrarian trading is more stabilizing than momentum trading
in our setting. It is true that in our setting a rare situation can arise whereby prices change
purely because of a large noise trading shock and Ps positive-feedback strategy moves prices
further away from the fundamental, but similarly there can be a rare situation whereby Ps
optimal strategy is contrarian and due to some extreme draws of noise trading, his contrarian
trading delays news about the fundamental from being reected into prices.
5 Discussion
As discussed in Section 3, we view the noise traders in our model as capturing a large number
of traders who trade for idiosyncratic reasons outside the model. Therefore, the main argument
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for assuming normally distributed noise trading stems from the central limit theorem. However,
technically, many realistic properties of our model rely on the less restrictive assumption of log-
concave noise trading. Indeed, a log-concave distribution guarantees that the Market updates at
date 2 in the "correct direction" - that is, in state R = U , if trader P submits a positive quantity
in equilibrium, then higher order ows at date 2 always signal a higher posterior probability
that the state is indeed R = U . It also guarantees that the expected value E [jy1; R] is
increasing in date 1 order ow, which for many prior distributions also implies that the date
1 equilibrium price is increasing in the order ow. Both of these properties hold because log-
concavity implies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). These properties are realistic
in the context of nancial markets and guarantee that sophisticated large traders in our model
face a meaningful trade-o¤ in the spirit of Kyle (1985) namely, an informed trader (either with
superior information about the fundamental directly or indirectly due to superior knowledge of
his own past actions) benets from trading a higher volume due to positive expected returns,
but trading a higher volume is costly due to market impact as it reveals more about his private
information whether about the fundamental or about his own type.
In our proofs we frequently relied only on log-concavity rather than on the explicit form
of the normal density (6). For example, the determinants of the direction of price-contingent
trading in the case of two- and three-point prior distribution hold for any (symmetric) log-
concave noise trading. Technically, the explicit form of the normal distribution was mostly
useful for proving that the traders problem is quasi-concave in his own action. Because the
traders objective function is an integral of a non-trivial function, quasi-concavity is generally
di¢ cult to prove analytically (see also footnote 24). However, at least numerically, it can be
veried that similar results hold with other log-concave noise trading distributions. It should
also be noted that to avoid a situation whereby P at date 2 has an incentive to trade an
innite amount which cannot occur in equilibrium we need at least that the noise trading
distribution, fs (:), is such that the likelihood ratio r (y2) =
fs(y2 h2)
fs(y2)
is unbounded, which is
true for some, but not all log-concave densities.28
While log-concave noise trading is important for generating realistic properties of equilibrium
prices and tradersincentives, the choice of the prior distribution is much more exible. The
model can be solved, at least numerically, for many di¤erent prior distributions. However,
the choice of the prior is clearly crucial for the more qualitative results of our paper. We
used the examples of a normal, two-point, and three-point prior. The rst two are among the
most common assumptions in this literature, as reected by the fact that there exist direct
28By unbounded, we mean that lim
y2!s
r (y2) ! 1 for 0 < h2 < s. For example, not just the normal, but also
the Beta (; ) distribution with parameters , > 1 is strictly log-concave and has an unbounded likelihood
ratio. However, Gamma (k; ) with k > 0 is strictly log-concave, but the likelihood ratio is not unbounded
(Gamma is also not symmetric around zero).
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benchmarks for the baseline case with no uncertainty about traderstypes see Kyle (1985)
and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) for the case with a normal prior and Cho and El
Karoui (2000) for the case with a two-point prior. Importantly, we nd opposite results for the
direction of Ps optimal trading at date 2 between the two-point and the normal prior. We get
additional insights using the three-point prior that is a transparent proxy for many distributions
in di¤erent shapes. In particular, what appears to be crucial is how much probability mass is
in the center of the distribution and whether the prior has a bounded support.
It is useful to note that if date 1 price is increasing in the order ow and informed traders
prot at date 1 is quasi-concave (with interior maximum), then there is a pure strategy equilib-
rium where a set of properties are true, which allows us to argue that the forces that determine
the direction of Ps trading remain present for other distributions. For example, assume that
the fundamental, , is a continuous variable;29 that noise trading is also continuous in the
interval [ s,s]; and fs (s) is log-concave and symmetric.
Proposition 7 If date 1 price is increasing in the order ow and the informed tradersproblem
is quasi-concave (with interior maximum), then:
1. The total demand of informed traders, gR () in state R 2 fI; Ug is strictly increasing in
.
2. It holds that gI () > (<) gU () for any  > (<) 0.
Proof. Part 1 follows from results in the monotone comparative statics literature that we
can use to explore informed tradersprots (3) and (2). Denote in state R = U trader Ks
expected price when demanding hUK1 as pE
 
hUK1
  R s s p1  hUK1 + s1 fs (s1) ds1. From Mil-
grom and Shannon (1994) it is known that gU () = arg maxhUK1 h
UK
1
 
   pE
 
hUK1

is weakly
increasing in  if the traders problem has increasing di¤erences (which also implies the payo¤
is supermodular) in hUK1 and . This is indeed true as for any ~ >  and ~h
UK
1 > h
UK
1 , it holds
that ~hUK1

~   pE(hUK1 )

  ~hUK1

   pE(~hUK1 )

> hUK1

~   pE(hUK1 )

  hUK1
 
   pE(hUK1 )

() (~hUK1   hUK1 )(~   ) > 0. From Edlin and Shannon (1998), it is also known that
gU () is strictly increasing if additionally the payo¤ is strictly increasing if the rst deriv-
ative of the payo¤ (prot) is strictly increasing in , which is also true in our model, as
@hUK1
 
   pE
 
hUK1

=@hUK1 =    pE
 
hUK1
   hUK1 p0E  hUK1  is clearly increasing in . The
proof is similar for the state R = I, where the same monotone comparative statics establish
that Ks and Ps individual demand is increasing in , and so is the sum of their demands.
For part 2, notice that given the above assumptions, it is enough to only look at the rst order
conditions to nd the unique equilibrium demands by all informed traders. Also, it is easy to
29This is only to simplify notation, as similar arguments hold for a discrete fundamental.
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verify that given , both K and P demand the same quantity in state R = I: We nd that the
equilibrium total informed demand gR () in state R solves
 =
Z s
 s
(p1 (s1 + gU ()) + gU () p
0
1 (s1 + gU ())) fs (s1) ds1
 =
Z s
 s

p1 (s1 + gI ()) +
gI ()
2
p01 (s1 + gI ())

fs (s1) ds1
As by part 1 gR () is invertible, it must also hold that
g 1U (y) =
Z s
 s
(p1 (s1 + y) + yp
0
1 (s1 + y)) fs (s1) ds1 (24)
g 1I (y) =
Z s
 s

p1 (s1 + y) +
y
2
p01 (s1 + y)

fs (s1) ds1,
where an order ow y  gR (). It is straightforward to verify that gR () =  gR ( ) and
clearly y > 0 i¤  > 0. Because date 1 equilibrium price is increasing in the order ow, it
holds that g 1U (y)  g 1I (y) = y2
R s
 s p
0
1 (s1 + y) fs (s1) ds1 > (<) 0 for any y > (<) 0. Taken
y = gU () > 0, we nd that g 1U (y) > g
 1
I (y) ()  > g 1I (gU ()) () gI () > gU () for
any  > 0. The case y < 0 is immediate by symmetry.
The most important implication of Proposition 7 is that xing any fundamental, two in-
formed traders trade a higher quantity in equilibrium than one informed trader. This implies
that conditional on date 1 order ow y1, the state R and the fundamental  are not independent.
In particular, Pr (U j; y1) = fs(y1 gU ()) Pr(U j)fs(y1 gU ()) Pr(U j)+fs(y1 gI()) Pr(Ij) is generally a function of . This
allows to conclude that in general there will be a di¤erence between uninformed Ps and the
markets expectations. Namely, it holds that
E [jy1; U ]  p1 = E [  Pr (U j; y1) jy1]
Pr (U jy1)   E [jy1] =
Cov (;Pr (U j; y1))
Pr (U jy1) ,
where we used the market e¢ ciency condition (1) and Bayesrule f (jy1; U) = f(jy1) Pr(U j;y1)Pr(U jy1) .
As we argued that Pr (U j; y1) is a function of , it is clear that  and Pr (U j; y1) are not
independent, which means that the covariance will generally not be zero. Therefore, our main
result that price-contingent trading is protable in a setting where there is uncertainty about
traderstypes is very general.
Also, given Proposition 7, the forces that a¤ect the direction of the di¤erence E [jy1; U ] p1
are also present more generally. As an example, assume that both noise trading and the fun-
damental  are continuous and have support in ( 1;1) and noise trading has symmetric
log-concave density. In such case, by Proposition 7 part 1, we know that gR (:) is an invert-
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ible function. Therefore, in state R we obtain the following signal from the order ow only:
given y1 and unknown noise trading shock s1, the fundamental is 
 = g 1R (y1   s1). The
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of  conditional on the order ow only is therefore,
Pr ( < ) = Pr
 
g 1R (y1   s1) < 

= 1   Fs (y1   gR ()), where Fs is the c.d.f. of noise
trading. By part 2 of Proposition 7 and the fact that the c.d.f. is monotonically increasing,
1   Fs (y1   gU ()) < (>) 1   Fs (y1   gI ()) for any gI () > (<) gU () ()  > (<) 0. This
conrms that the distribution of  conditional on the order ow only is more dispersed in
state R = U compared to state R = I for any order ow y1. The probability density func-
tion of the fundamental conditional on order ow only, is g0R () fs (y1   gR ()). We nd that
the expected value conditional on the order ow only is then
R1
 1 g
0
R () fs (y1   gR ()) d
=
R1
 1 g
 1
R (y) fs (y1   y) dy =
R1
0
g 1R (y) (fs (y1   y)  fs (y1 + y)) dy. It then holds that
the di¤erence in expectations is
R1
0
 
g 1U (y)  g 1I (y)

(fs (y1   y)  fs (y1 + y)) dy > (<) 0
if y1 > (<) 0. The inequality follows from (24) and Lemma A.1 in Appendix A. Therefore, if
y1 > 0, then in state R = U the order ow signal has a higher mean (which pushes toward
positive-feedback trading) and a more dispersed distribution (which pushes toward negative-
feedback trading) than in state R = I. Any Bayesian updating trades o¤ these two e¤ects,
and which one dominates depends on the prior. If, additionally, the distributions are bounded
then the same e¤ects are present and there are additional e¤ects due to these bounds - most
importantly, large order ows in absolute value are always more likely in state R = I.30
Apart from the distributions, there are other assumptions in the model that can potentially
be relaxed. Changing any of these would not alter our main results and would either be trivial
or complicated with limited additional insights. First, it would be trivial to add more type K
and type P traders. All the e¤ects would be the same as long as the number of sophisticated
traders of type K and P is nite. The reason why K and P trade nite amounts and earn
returns on their information is because they have market impact and they are aware of it. If the
number of type P traders were innite, then they would be indistinguishable from the Market;
if the number of typeK traders were innite, then there would be strong-form market e¢ ciency,
but it would also generate an information acquisition paradox in the spirit of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980). Second, it would also be possible to add more trading rounds where uninformed
P can trade. This would complicate the model as P would likely have a Kyles (1985) type of
incentive to split his orders and reveal information more slowly. However, the Market will then
be imperfectly and slowly learning about the true state until the price eventually converges to
30If the prior has bounded support
 ;  and noise trading support is noticeably wider (such that any order
ows can be generated by a noise trading shock), then conditional on the order ow only in state R the cdf
of  is
Fs(y1+gR()) Fs(y1 gR())
Fs(y1+gR()) Fs(y1 gR()) and the probability density function is
g0R()Fs(y1 gR())
Fs(y1+gR()) Fs(y1 gR()) . With some
algebra we can then identify the same e¤ects, and nd that informed trading at the highest fundamental, gR
 


in R = fI; Ug a¤ect both the mean and dispersion.
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E [jy1; R]. Third, to highlight our main e¤ects we have assumed that K only trades at date
1. Our e¤ects would still obtain, however, if we allowed K to trade at date 2 as well. In fact,
while K at date 2 may some times want to take an opposite position to P , he would never fully
neutralize Ps prot opportunities. The reason is that K still faces the usual trade-o¤ whereby
trading too aggressively reveals too much information to the Market. Moreover, often K would
want to trade in the same direction as uninformed P , because of his knowledge of . As a
result, K would be unable to fully neutralize the position of uninformed P . In sum, allowing
K to trade at date 2 as well would make the model less transparent and more complicated as
there would be more strategic incentives in play, without altering our main insight. Finally,
altering the assumption that K knows Ps type or assuming that both traders can be informed
or uninformed about the fundamental, would complicate the model but not alter the main
result that trading without direct knowledge of the fundamental is protable in a more general
setting that allows for uncertainty about traders types.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have established that price-contingent trading is the optimal strategy of large rational
agents in a setting in which there is uncertainty about whether large traders are informed about
the fundamental. We have then provided conditions under which price-contingent trading is
positive-feedback or contrarian in equilibrium. A robust implication of our results is that the
order ow is predictable from current prices even if the market is semi-strong e¢ cient and
future returns cannot be predicted from current prices.
We have started the paper by noting that quantitative strategies by large nancial institu-
tions are price-contingent in that they map past prices into orders and trades. We highlight
that knowing privately as little as their past trades is su¢ cient to enable large agents to better
learn fundamental information from prices than all market participants who have only imperfect
information about these traderspositions. Clark-Joseph (2012) provides preliminary empirical
evidence that supports our mechanism. Of course, in the real world quantitative strategies can
be a lot more sophisticated than our simple equilibrium momentum and contrarian strategies,
and use as input an array of quantiable public information in addition to prices. Quantiable
information can arise from superior knowledge of market participants trading styles rather
than economic fundamentals as traditionally thought. Extending our model to capture the
additional nuances of real-world quantitative strategies is an exciting area for future research.
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A Background theorems and lemmas
Lemma A.1 If fs (:) is strictly log-concave, then it holds that
fs (x2   c2)
fs (x2   c1) >
fs (x1   c2)
fs (x1   c1) for any x2 > x1 and c2 > c1. (25)
Proof. By denition of log-concavity it must hold that
 ln (fs (x1   c2)) + (1  ) ln (fs (x2   c1)) < ln (fs ( (x1   c2) + (1  ) (x2   c1))) and
(1  ) ln (fs (x1   c2)) +  ln (fs (x2   c1)) < ln (fs ((1  ) (x1   c2) +  (x2   c1))) for any
0 <  < 1. Let  = x2 x1
x2 x1+c2 c1 . Then ln (fs ( (x1   c2) + (1  ) (x2   c1))) = ln (fs (x1   c1))
and
ln (fs ((1  ) (x1   c2) +  (x2   c1))) = ln (fs (x2   c2)). Adding up the inequalities, we ob-
tain that ln (fs (x1   c2))+ln (fs (x2   c1)) < ln (fs (x1   c1))+ln (fs (x2   c2)). Exponentiating
both sides and rearranging, we obtain (25).
Note that, in probability theory, this implies that if we interpret c as a signal about some
random variable such that x = c + s, where the density fs (s) is strictly log-concave, then
the conditional distribution of f (xjc) = fs (x  c) satises the strict monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP).
Corollary A.1.1 If fs (:) is strictly log-concave and symmetric (fs (s) = fs ( s)), then for any
x > 0, it holds that
fs (x  c) > (<) fs (x+ c) for any c > (<) 0
Proof. For the case c > 0, let x2 = x; x1 =  x and c = c2 > c1 = 0. By (25) fs(x c)fs(x) >
fs( x c)
fs( x) =
fs(x+c)
fs(x)
=) fs (x  c) > fs (x+ c). For the case c < 0, let x2 = x; x1 =  x and
c = c1 < c2 = 0 to obtain that
fs(x)
fs(x c) >
fs( x)
fs( x c) =
fs(x)
fs(x+c)
=) fs (x+ c) > fs (x  c).
For the next Lemma, assume that the prior distribution in state R 2 fI; Ug is f (jR) 
fR () = fR ( ) in between   and  (the case  = 1, is easy to incorporate in this
framework). We consider a continuous prior, but following a similar logic it is easy to prove it
for a discrete prior. Assume that informed traders total demand at date 1 is symmetric around
zero and strictly increasing, i.e., hUK1 = gU () and h
IK
1 + h
IP
1 = gI (), where gR () = gR ( )
and g0R () > 0 for R 2 f0; 1g. Assume that uninformed Ps demand at date 1 is some constant
h1U .
Lemma A.2 If the noise trading distribution is log-concave and symmetric, fs (s1), it holds
for any prior distribution that E [j~y1; R]   E [jy1; R] > 0 for any ~y1 > y1. It also holds that
E [jy1; I] = E [j ( y1) ; I] and E

j  y1   h1U ; U =  E j   y1 + h1U ; U.
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Proof. The proof uses Milgrom (1981) and log-concavity of fs (s). Dene the observable
part of the order ow in state R as follows: y1R = y1 if R = I and y1R = y1   h1U
if R = U . It then holds that y1R = gR () + s1 for R = fI; Ug. We rst show that
E [j~y1; R]   E [jy1; R] > 0 for any ~y1R > y1R. It is well know that that E [j~y1R; R] >
E [jy1R; R] if the cumulative distribution F (j~y1; R) dominates F (jy1; R) in the sense of rst
order stochastic dominance, i.e., F (j~y1R; R)  F (jy1R; R) for all ; with strict inequality
for some . Given that the order ow is y1R = gR () + s1, gR (:) is increasing, we know
from Lemma A.1, that log-concavity of fs (:) implies that fs

~y1R   gR(^)

fs
 
~y1R   gR()

>
fs
 
~y1R   gR()

fs

y1R   gR(^)

for every ^ > . We can equivalently write this inequal-
ity as f

~y1Rj^; R

f
 
y1Rj; R

> f
 
~y1Rj; R

f

y1Rj^; R

for every ^ > . The proof that
the latter inequality implies rst order stochastic dominance for any prior density f (jR) is
in Milgrom (1981) Proposition 1. As in state R = I, y1R = y1, this immediately proves
that E [j~y1; I]   E [jy1; I] > 0 for any ~y1 > y1. For the state R = U , notice that be-
cause h1U is known, conditioning on y1 and on y1U = y1   h1U is equivalent and it must
always hold that E [jy1; R] = E [jy1R; R] so we know that E [j~y1; U ]   E [jy1; U ] > 0 for
any ~y1   h1U > y1   h1U , ~y1 > y1. For the second part, note that we can express that
E [jy1R; R] =
R 
  f (jy1R; R) d =
R 
  fs(y1R gR())fR()dR 
  fs(y1R gR())fR()d
. Using the symmetry of fs (:) and
fR (), we then nd that E [j   y1R; R] =
R 
  f (j   y1R; R) d =
R 
  fs( y1R gR())fR()dR 
  fs( y1R gR())fR()d
=
 
R 
  fs(y1R gR())fR()dR 
  fs(y1R gR())fR()d
=  E [jy1R; R]. Using then the denition of y1R proves the lemma.
Theorem A.3 (Prékopa (1973) Theorem 6) Let f(x;y) be a function of n+m variables where
x is an n-component and y is an m-component vector. Suppose that f is logarithmic concave
in Rn+m and let A be a convex subset of Rm. Then the function of the variable x:Z
A
f(x;y)dy
is logarithmic concave in the entire space Rn.
Theorem A.4 (Chebyshevs integral inequality) Let , ;  : [a; b] ! R and f(x) : [a; b] !
R+, where R is the set of real numbers. We have
1. if  and  are both non-decreasing or both non-increasing, thenZ b
a
f (x) dx
Z b
a
 (x)  (x) f (x) dx 
Z b
a
 (x) f (x) dx
Z b
a
 (x) f (x) dx
2. if one is non-increasing and the other is non-decreasing, then the inequality is reversed.
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Proof. See for example Proposition 2.1 in Eqozcue, Garcia, and Wong (2009). Also see
Mitrinovi´c, Pe¼cari´c, and Fink (1993).
B Proofs
Proof of the remaining parts of Theorem 1
Assume that E [jy1; U ]  p1 > 0. It is clear from (9) that the optimal demand hUP2 cannot
be negative. Because by Lemma 2 Ps problem at date 2 is log-concave, it is su¢ cient to only
explore the rst order condition. Using (6), (9), (10), (11), (12) and noticing that
@'s(y2 hUP2 )
@hUP2
=
y2 hUP2
2s
's
 
y2   hUP2

, we obtain that
@UP2
@hUP2
=
Z 1
 1
Q1's (y2)
Q1's (y2) + (1 Q1)'s
 
y2   h2
 1  (hUP2 )2
2s
+
hUP2 y2
2s

's
 
y2   hUP2

dy2 (26)
Dene   h2
s
and z  y2
s
, where dy2 = sdz . From (6) we can notice that then 's
 
y2   h2

=
1
s
 (z   ) and 's (y2) = 1s (z), where  (:) is the p.d.f. of a standard normal. The optimal
demand must solve @
UP
2
@hUP2
= 0 and it must hold in equilibrium that optimal demand
 
hUP2

=
h2 = s. Using all this, in (26), we obtain that  is the positive solution ofZ 1
 1
Q1 (z)
Q1 (z) + (1 Q1) (z   )
 
1  2 + z (z   ) dz = 0; (27)
which we know to be unique by Lemma 2. Because s does not enter in (27), it also proves that
Ps demand is proportional to s and only depends on Q1. The proof for the case E [jy1; U ] 
p1 < 0 is similar and in such a case we need the unique negative solution of (27). It is easy to
verify that if  > 0 solves (27), then also   > 0 solves (27).
Next let us prove that  > 1 by contradiction. Suppose instead that 0 <  < 1 solves (27).
From (27), it must then be the case that 
R1
 1 z
Q1(z)
Q1(z)+(1 Q1)(z ) (z   ) dz < 0. Using that
 (:) is an even function, we can rewrite this as

Z 1
0
zQ1 (z)
 
1
Q1
(z)
(z ) + (1 Q1)
  1
Q1
(z)
(z+)
+ (1 Q1)
!
dz < 0
Because  (:) is log-concave, it holds that  (z   ) >  (z + ) for all z;  > 0 by Corollary A.1.1
from Appendix A. This implies that 1
Q1
(z)
(z ) +(1 Q1)
< 1
Q1
(z)
(z+)
+(1 Q1)
. So all terms inside the
integral are non-negative for all z  0 (with strict inequality for z > 0), leads to a contradiction
and therefore 0 <  < 1 does not hold.
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Proof of the part 4 of Proposition 2
Assume that R = U . From parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 2, it holds that (E[jy1;U ] p1)
Q1
= 1y1
4  .
Also, because Q1 =  by part 2 of Proposition 2, we nd from (10) that E [Q2jy1; U ] is not a
function of y1, and we can denote E [Q2jy1; U ] = E [Q2jU ]. From (13),we then nd that
UP2 =
(
s
1E[Q2jU ]
4  y1 if y1 > 0
 s1E[Q2jU ]4  y1 if y1 < 0
Suppose that P deviates and trades some hUP1 6= 0. Then from part 1 and 2 of Proposition 2,
we know that in state R = U; y1jU = hUP1 + 21 + s1  N

hUP1 ;
2U
42
+ 2s

 N  hUP1 ; 2yU
and p1 = 1 


21
+ hUP1 + s1

, where yU 
q
4 
2 s: Because E [jU ] = 0, it holds that
E

hUP1 (   p1) jU

=    hUP1 2 1. Using the above, we nd that expected prot (4) at date 1
UP1 =  
 
hUP1
2
1 +s
1E[Q2jU ]
4  [Pr (y1 > 0jU)E [y1jU; y1 > 0]  Pr (y1 < 0jU)E [y1jU; y1 < 0]]
Given the moments of truncated normal, E [y1jU; y1 > 0] = h
UP
1 (1 ( hUP1 =yU))+( hUP1 =yU)yU
Pr(y1>0jU)
and E [y1jU; y1 < 0] = h
UP
1 ( hUP1 =yU) ( hUP1 =yU)yU
Pr(y1<0jU) , where  (:) and  (:) are the c.d.f. and
p.d.f. of standard normal, respectively.
Using that  (:) is symmetric, we can then express Ps expected prot as
UP1 =  
 
hUP1
2
1 + s
1E[Q2jU ]
4 

hUP1

2

hUP1
yU

  1

+ 2

hUP1
yU

yU

Di¤erentiating this31, we obtain
@UP1
@hUP1
=  21hUP1 + 1 sE[Q2jU ]4 

2

hUP1
yU

  1

Clearly, @
UP
1
@hUP1
jhUP1 =0 = 0 as  (0) = 1=2. The second derivative
@2UP1
@hUP1 @h
UP
1
=  21

1  sE[Q2jU ](h
UP
1 =yU)
yU (4 )

, and at hUP1 = 0, it must hold that 1 sE[Q2jU ]yU (4 )  (0) >
0, which can be proved (at least for all values of  that are not too close to one).32 If the in-
equality holds, then UP1 is also concave and zero is the global maximum.
31Note that 0 (ax) = a (ax) and 0 (ax) = a2x0 (x)
32Namely, using yU 
q
4 
2 s and  (0) =
1p
2
, we can express the inequality as  <
q
2(4 )
(2 )
(4 )
E[Q2jU ] .
As the Market updates in the right direction, on average E [Q2jU ] < . So a su¢ cient condition is  <q
2(4 )
(2 )
(4 )
 . Furthermore, it can be shown that  
p
2 for any   0:5; where the inequality always holds.
It can also be shown that  < 1=
p
1   for any  > 0:5. So we can also be sure that the inequality holds for
at least for  < 0:994.
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Proof of Lemma 4
Without loss of generality, assume that  = . We start by the following lemma that benets
from Chebyshevs integral inequality.
Lemma B.1 For any pair of constants, such that c2 > c1, it holds thatR1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

y1's (y1   c2) dy1R1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

's (y1   c2) dy1

R1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

y1's (y1   c1) dy1R1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

's (y1   c1) dy1
, (28)
Proof. Consider a pair of constants c2 > c1 and the following integralZ 1
 1
y1

's (y1   c2)
's (y1   c1)   1
 
   p1 (y1)

's (y1   c1) dy1
where 's (:) is given by (6). Notice that
@

's(y1 c2)
's(y1 c1) 1

@y1
= 's(y1 c2)
's(y1 c1)

'0s(y1 c2)
's(y1 c2)  
'0s(y1 c1)
's(y1 c1)

> 0 .
The inequality is implied by the facts that 's(y1 c2)
's(y1 c1) > 0 and
'0s(y1 c2)
's(y1 c2) >
'0s(y1 c1)
's(y1 c1) . The latter is
because y1 c2 < y1 c1 and for any log-concave function fs (:) it is true that (ln (fs (x)))0 = f 0s(x)fs(x)
is decreasing in x. From (6), we can also explicitly nd that '
0
s(y1 c2)
's(y1 c2)  
'0s(y1 c1)
's(y1 c1) =
c2 c1
2s
> 0.
Given that y1 and

's(y1 c2)
's(y1 c1)   1

are both increasing in y1 and
 
   p1 (y1)

's (y   c1) > 0
for all nite y1 (part 7 in Lemma 3), it follows from Chebyshevs inequality33 (Theorem A.4 in
Appendix A) thatZ 1
 1
y1

's(y1 c2)
's(y1 c1)   1

(   p1 (y1))'s (y   c1) dy1 R1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

('s (y   c2)  's (y   c1)) dy1 
R1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

y1's (y1   c1) dy1R1
 1
 
   p1 (y1)

's (y   c1) dy1
Simplifying this gives (28).
We can then explore the traders problem. Consider informed Ks problem in state R = I
when  = . K takes the functional form of prices (18) and Ps strategy hIP2 =
gI
2
as given,
and then chooses hIK1 to maximize (22). It is clear that h
IK
1  0 cannot be optimal as it would
lead to negative prots, hence we only consider hIK1 > 0. Using that by (6)
@'s

y1 hIK1  
gI
2

@hIK1
=
y1 hIK1  
gI
2
2s
's
 
y1   hIK1   gI2

, and simplifying we obtain that
33Note that Theorem A.4 is stated for a denite integral where x is in the interval [a; b] ; while here we have
an improper integral. This is not a problem, because all functions inside the integrals are integrable and we
could have performed a change of variables y1 = x1 x2 to consider a denite integral in the interval [ 1; 1].
38
 @IK2
@hIK1
=  

1  h
IK
1

hIK1 +
gI
2

2s
Z 1
 1
 
   p (y1)

's
 
y1   hIK1   gI2

dy1 (29)
+
hIK1
2s
Z 1
 1
 
   p (y1)

y1's
 
y1   hIK1   gI2

dy1
To prove that  @IK2
@hIK1
is a single-crossing function, we need to show that for all h^ > h > 0,
 @IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h  0 =)  
@IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h^  0 and that  
@IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h > 0 =)  
@IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h^ > 0. So let
us assume that  @IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h  (>) 0 holds. Using (29), we can express this as
LHS1 

2s
h
   h+ hIP1   (<) R1 1( p(y1))y1's(y1 h hIP1 )dy1R1
 1( p(y1))'s(y1 h hIP1 )dy1
 RHS1
Similarly, the inequality  @IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h^  (>) 0 can be written as
LHS2 

2s
h^
 

h^+ gU
2

 (<)
R1
 1( p(y1))y1's

y1 h^  gI2

dy1R1
 1( p(y1))'s

y1 h^  gI2

dy1
 RHS2
Then notice that h^ > h > 0 () 2sh  
 
h+ gI
2

> 
2
s
h^
 

h^+ gI
2

, hence LHS1 > LHS2.
We then obtain that LHS1  (<)RHS1 (because  @
IK
2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h  (>) 0) and RHS1  RHS2
(by property (28)), and indeed  @IK2
@hIK1
jhIK1 =h^ > 0 (LHS2 < RHS2) because LHS2 < LHS1 
(<)RHS1  RHS2. Hence Ks problem is quasi-concave and has a unique maximum. The
proof for  =   is similar.
Then consider the case where  = 0, then the equilibrium beliefs about the other traders
demand is hIP1 = 0. Di¤erentiating and simplifying gives
 @IK2
@hIK1
=
R1
 1 p
 
s1 + h
IK
1

's (s1) ds1 + h
IK
1
R1
 1 p
0  s1 + hIK1 's (s1) ds1. It is immediate that
this is positive for all hIK1 < 0, and negative for h
IK
1 > 0, because by point 3 in Lemma 3.1,
the price is increasing in the order ow and Ks demand a¤ects the order linearly. Due to
prices being increasing in the order ow and symmetry of the price around zero (part 4 and 5
of Lemma 3), it is also true that the rst termR1
 1 p
 
s1 + h
IK
1

's (s1) ds1 =
R1
0
 
p
 
s1 + h
IK
1
  p  s1   hIK1 's (s1) ds1 is positive i¤ hIK1 >
0. Because informed Ps prot has the same functional form, the proof is exactly the same.
The proof for state R = U is similar. We write down the rst derivative of Ks problem (21)
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when  = , as it will be useful for the next proof.
 @UK2
@hUK1
=  

1  hUK1
2s
Z 1
 1
 
   p (y1)

's
 
y1   hUK1

dy1 (30)
+
hUK1
2s
Z 1
 1
 
   p (y1)

y1's
 
y1   hUK1

dy1
is a single crossing function, and so are the equivalents for  = 0 and  =  .
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 4 we know that there is a unique maximum and we can focus on the rst order
conditions (29) and (30). It is straightforward to prove that K and P and must trade the same
quantity in equilibrium in state R = I and that the solution is symmetric for  =  and  =  .
Overall in the equilibrium the Markets beliefs must be consistent with optimal strategies, i.e.,
it must hold that hIK1 = h
IP
1 =
gI
2
and hUK1 = gU . Dene R  gRs for R 2 fI; Ug and z 
y2
s
.
From (6) 's (y2   gR) = 1s (z   R), 's (y2) = 1s (z) and 's (y2 + gR) = 1s (z + R), where
 is the p.d.f. of a standard normal. Using (18), we then nd that
p (z)  p1 (zs) =   (z   I) + (1  ) (z   U)   (z + I) + (1  ) (z + U)
 (z   I) + (1  ) (z   U) +  (z + I) + (1  ) (z + U) + 21  (z)
that clearly does not depend on s and it holds that p1 (zs) =  p1 ( zs).
Using these in (29) and (30) and equating @
IJ
2
@hIJ1
= 0 for J 2 fK;Pg; @UK2
@hUK1
= 0, we nd that
I and U are the positive solutions of
@IJ2
@hIJ1
jhIJ1 =gI=  

1  2I
2
Z 1
 1
 
   p (z) (z   I) dz+I2 Z 1 1     p (z) z (z   I) dz = 0
(31)
@UK2
@hUK1
jhUK1 =gU=  
 
1  2U
 Z 1
 1
 
   p (z) (z   U) dz + U Z 1
 1
 
   p (z) z (z   U) dz = 0
We already know from the proof of Lemma 4 that if  = 0, it is optimal for informed traders
to trade zero. This proves part 1 of Proposition 3.
For part 2 notice that from (31), we can express the rst order condition of trader J 2 fK;Pg
in state R = I as
@IJ2
@hIJ1
jhIJ1 =gI =  12
Z 1
 1
 
   p (z) (z   I) dz   12 @UK2@hUK1 jhUK1 =gI = 0
By part 6 of Lemma 3
 
   p1 (y1)

> 0 for all nite y1. Therefore, also
 
   p (z) > 0 for all
nite z and
 
   p (z) (z   I)  0 with strict inequality for some z. This implies that it
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must hold that
 @
UK
2
@hUK1
jhUK1 =gI > 0.
Because  @UK2
@hUK1
is a single-crossing function and @
UK
2
@hUK1
jhUK1 =gU = 0, it then follows that gI > gU .
For the uninformed traders strategy, we need to verify that it is optimal for him to trade
zero. We now verify that the rst order condition of his problem indeed holds at zero. Dene
 (y1)  E [jy1; U ]   E [jy1; I] and Q1U (y1)  E [Q2jy1; U ]. By (19) in Lemma 3 (and also
by Lemma A.1 in Appendix A), it holds that  (y1) =   ( y1). Also, it is clear from
(20) that it holds that Q1 (y1) = Q1 ( y1). Using this in (10) and (12) we conrm that (12)
Q1U (y1) = Q1U ( y1).
Recalling uninformed Ps optimal trading strategy at date 2 from (13) in Theorem 1 and
using (7) and (9), we can then nd Ps expected prot at date 2 conditional on y1 as
UP2 =
(
sQ1U (y1)  (y1) if  (y1) > 0
 sQ1U (y1)  (y1) if  (y1) < 0
Suppose that at date 1, uninformed P trades hUP1 , then he also knows that the distribution of
the total order ow is fs
 
y1   hUP1   gU

if  = ; fs
 
y1   hUP1

if  = 0 and fs
 
y1   hUP1 + gU

if  =  . Using all this, (17), E [jU ] = 0, we can use the law of iterated expectations to express
the expected prot of uninformed P before the date 1 trading as
UP1 =  hUP1
1R
0
p1 (y1)
 
m
 
y1   hUP1
 m  y1 + hUP1  dy1+R
(y1)>0
sQ1U (y1)  (y1)
 
m
 
y1   hUP1

+m
 
y1 + h
UP
1

dy1,
where m (x)  1 
2
's (x  gU) +'s (x) + 1 2 's (x+ gU). Because of symmetry 's (:; ) it holds
that m (x) = m ( x) and m0 (x) =  m0 ( x).
The rst order condition is
@UP1
@hUP1
=  
1R
0
p1 (y1)
 
m
 
y1   hUP1
 m  y1 + hUP1  dy1
+ hUP1
1R
0
p1 (y1)
 
m0
 
y1   hUP1
 m0  y1 + hUP1  dy1
  R
(y1)<0
sQ1U (y1)  (y1)
 
m0
 
y1   hUP1
 m0  y1 + hUP1  dy1
Replacing in hUP1 = 0, we can now verify that
@UP1
@hUP1
jhUP1 =0 = 0. Because the zero-trading
result of P at date 1 is uncontroversial, we skip here the proof of it being global maximum.
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Similarly to the case with a normal prior, it can be veried that zero is a global maximum of
Ps problem, at least as long as  is not too close to one.
C Normal prior, independent of the state
We now consider that the prior density of the fundamental is f () = 1p2p exp

  2
22p

and
the fundamental is independent of the state, i.e., f (jR) = f () for R 2 fI; Ug. We can
no longer conjecture that the price is linear in the order ow, because the Market will learn
about the state from the order ow. Instead, we conjecture that the Market believes that total
informed trading in state R 2 fI; Ug is gR () =  gR ( ) and P does not trade at date one, if
the state is R = U . Conditional on the state, E [jy1; R] =
R1
 1 f (jy1; R) d as we know the
distributions and by Bayesrule it holds that f (jy1; R) = f(y1j;R)f(jR)f(y1jR) =
's(y1 gR())f()
f(y1jR) and
f (y1jR) =
R1
 1 's (y1   gR ()) f () d. Also by Bayess rule Q1 = Pr (Ijy1) = f(y1jI)f(y1jU)+f(y1jI) .
Using this in (7), we nd that date one price is
p1 (y1) =
R1
 1  ('s (y1   gI ()) + (1  )'s (y1   gU ())) f () dR1
 1 ('s (y1   gI ()) + (1  )'s (y1   gU ())) f () d
. (32)
It is easy to verify that p1 (y1) =  p1 ( y1).
As the aim of this Section is only to verify that our results in Section 4.3 are not driven by the
particular dependence structure between  and R through a numerical exercise, we do not aim
to prove analytically that tradersproblems are quasi-concave and have unique maximum.34
So to characterize the equilibrium, we only present the rst order conditions of the traders
problem. After taking the rst order conditions in (3) and (2), it is easy to verify that it must
hold that in state R = I, both informed traders trade the same optimal quantity hIK1 = h
UP
1 .
Imposing then that the equilibrium beliefs must be consistent with the actual trades, we nd
after changing variables and simplifying that gU () and gI () solve
 =
Z 1
 1
p1 (y1)

1  g
2
U ()
2s
+
gU () y1
2s

's (y1   gU ()) d (33)
 =
Z 1
 1
p1 (y1)

1  g
2
I ()
22s
+
gI () y1
22s

's (y1   gI ()) d.
and it is straightforward to verify the symmetry of strategies: gR () =  gR ( ). Equations
(32) and (33) characterize the functions that determine equilibrium strategies and price. While
this problem does not have an analytical solution, the way to solve it is to note that we
34In particular, it will be shown shortly that the price and equilibrium strategies are almost linear, and
therefore quasiconcavity of the traders problem is trivial to verify ex post.
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Figure 4: Date 1 price p1, updated probabilityQ1 = Pr (Ijy1), and the di¤erence in expectations
E [jy1; U ]  E [jy1; U ] as a function of the order ow.
can approximate any function with a polynomial. We proceed by assuming that gR () is a
polynomial, derive the price (32) and change the constants in the polynomial until (33).
For the numerical exercise assume that  = 0:5, which is the case in which there is most
updating about the state R and hence the solution should in principle be most non-linear.
Without loss of generality assume s = 1 and p = 1 (note that similarly to other settings in
this paper, it can be veried that informed trading is proportional to the noise trading variance
s). It turns out that informed traders strategies do not need to be approximated with a
high order polynomial, but are already very well approximated by a linear function, namely
gU ()  1:0284 and gU ()  1:3712. Figure (4) presents the relevant results. The reason why
traders strategies are close to linear is that the price under linear strategies is "almost linear,"
i.e., the north-west panel of Figure (4) shows that it is hard to notice nonlinearity of price (the
R2 of the trendline is e¤ectively 1) - only when we zoom and show the di¤erence between the
price and a linear trendline (south-west panel), do we see that it is slightly non-linear. Because
informed traders care about the expected price that they do not know when they submit their
orders, these small nonlinearities have very little e¤ect on their optimal strategies. On the
north east panel we see that there is some, but limited updating of traders types. Because two
informed traders jointly trade more than one in absolute value, larger order ows in absolute
value tend to signal a higher probability that the state is R = I. At small order ows, the
Market tends to believe that the state is R = U , but even at zero, there is not much learning
about Ps type and therefore Ps trading opportunities remain. Finally on the south-east panel,
we see that the direction of Ps trading at date 2 is the same as in Section 4.3 - positive feedback.
For any y1 > (<) 0, it holds that E [jy1; U ] > (<)E [jy1; I] , E [jy1; U ] > (<) p1.
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